

SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY - CHINA IN THE FACE OF HISTORY: IDEOLOGICAL STEREOTYPES, PRAXEOLOGICAL CLICHES, HISTORICAL INERTIA

Ștefan BUZĂRNESCU, PhD Professor

Liliana Gabriela ILIE, PhD University Assistant

Faculty of Sociology and Psychology

West University of Timișoara

buzarnescu.stefan@gmail.com

Abstract: *The present article presents the elements that give originality to the Chinese model of sustainable development by solving the "enigma" of the complementarity between Chinese socialism and the Western market economy. Thus, while Western neo-liberalism devised its managerial profile according to "as slight as possible State" principles, the communist authorities in China has legitimately held the authority of the Communist Party, but have liberalized the property. If the 20th century was American, will the 21st century be Chinese? However, this point of view belonging to the sociological approach should not be ignored; a democratic world must ensure the legitimate free flow of all views. This text is a part of a large study "The Chinese Model of durable and sustainable development - a successful social experiment", finalized in the zonal laboratories belong the Sociologists Association, Timis county, The University of the West of Timisoara. As a sociological level, is the first sociological modelling of the Chinese social space focus on socialist market economy? The socialist market economy is an original model of development starting in China since Deng Xiaoping (1978) becoming leader of Communist Party (PCC). Today, China is the second economic power of the World. As the scientist, we have obligation to study all social evolutions, behind ideological reasons.*

Key words: *development sustainable, development durable, socialism, market economy, socialist market economy.*

1. Introduction

Allied in order to dispel the imperialist aspirations of Nazism who planned to promote a "new world order", the Union of American States and the Union of Soviet States were contaminated with the same syndrome of globalization at any cost, but from different angles: The USSR claimed the forthcoming revolution will be socialist, and the socialist Bolshevik-type model will be internationalized through "national and social liberation movements,"

while the US advocated for the perpetuation of the capitalist development model, even in the former colonies where the ethnic and social communities There... already had the reflexes of living in the normative frameworks of the "market economy".

To put some restraints of these slips which were risked becoming fundamentalist, James Burnham (1947), in his work *The Managerial Revolution*, stated unequivocally: the future revolution will be a managerial revolution! In the future development of human society, the ideological parameter will not be paramount, but the managerial factor will generate development and prosperity, that is, not ideological or military power will prevail, but the intelligence with which communities will capitalize on their material and human resources...

However, after the conclusion of World War II, the controversy continued in the area of what was called "the cold war": the combatants' gunshots turned into propagandistic bombs with simplifying effects on the complexity of social processes. In these coordinates, a hermeneutic stereotype centred on the reduction of the entire development to two poles: socialism versus capitalism, expressed itself; a cliché with a lasting career and present in many of the contemporary approaches (Daniel Bell, Alvin Toffler, and others, "popular capitalism", "welfare state", "systems convergence", John Naisbitt "bureaucratic capitalism", and so on).

Without causing ideological "noise", but also without having to invoke various complexes from different international bodies, the Chinese community from the continental part of the country proceeded calmly and with loyalty to its traditional values, being obliged, at present, to assume the role of a global actor of development, that cannot be ignored in any scenario of the future of the planet, irrespective of the doctrinal platform from which it is designed or merely regarded. The emergence of a global development project and the consistency with which it continuous, at the confluence of the endogenous factors, with the dynamics of exogenous factors, seem to be the starting point for the explanations concerning the objective definition China *place* in the international geopolitical phenomenally. Regarding China's *rank* in the world hierarchy, this aspect constitutes the concern of former world leaders from centuries past, apprehensive about the possible liderance of China for the 21st century. Similar to small, insignificant droplets of rain, which can cause large floods of unimaginable power, so the anonymous contributions of a billion and half Chinese, like small vectors of the synergistic composition in the Chinese community's social space, have generated a great deal of economic power; a power that will not stop merely at the economic component.

2. A succinct sociological modelling of the Chinese social space


Chronically criticized for hypothetical "deviations" from the "path of socialism" by Bolshevik type socialists (with the exception of Romania!) and side-lined to the edge of contempt by all "capitalist" countries, China has focused all its resources on optimizing its own reforms focused on a clear and transparently stated goal: *overcoming poverty and the existential precariousness of all social categories, in compatibility with its traditions of harmonious coexistence among all social segments and of maintaining the multi-millennial civil hierarchy set up as a source of social cohesion*. Three core values have formed the basis of the collective mindset: "work, family, fatherland", without waiting for saving solutions from its proximity or from its hypothetical friends from other continents. Accordingly, after the transition to the new regime (1911) and overcoming the historical watershed moment of May 4th 1911 (*the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution*¹, as per the ideological jargon of the time), the discovery of Marxism and the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (1921) marked a clear option for strengthening the system of "popular democracy" among the cadre of the People's Republic of China led by the CCP. It was the turning point of the former *Imperial China*, which, from its status of *popular China* was heading toward today's *communist China*.

Beyond the great variety of idiosyncrasies related to the ideological connotations of the subject under discussion, I appreciate as necessary an X-ray (a true *screening* of the economic operation model of the Chinese social space). Thus, in accordance with the "popular" project of building socialist-type power structures, the new Communist regime in Popular China undertook a socialization of "the means of production" through their nationalization. Noting that the practical results of extensive socialization did not meet all expectations, after the Great Leap forward (1957-1960), the socialization euphoria was tempered, the liberalization of the types of property taking inspiration from the folk traditions of millennial China, but also from the experiments conducted by other countries, on other continents, that were in the process of structural reform. The Leninist-Stalinist influences of banning all forms of market economy were discarded, and it returned to the traditional forms of associative life (family farms) specific to China, that assured the social cohesion of the Chinese community space. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1968) was the decisive test to curb any possible Bolshevik-type influences and to proceed with the option of re-launching a new current of loyalty of "the masses" for the on-going social transformations, by putting them into agreement with the Chinese collective mentality. Thus, the possible disjunction

¹ The last dynasty was the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911).

between the new government and the ancient Chinese community was eliminated.

In summary, the Chinese model can be presented, as a sociological model, as in the figure below:



where:

B C - financial spread available for financing development projects and for the resumption of the cycle of activities particular to the social space;

B C " - capital resulted at the end of the activity cycle;

GC - great capital, in the case of China the Chinese State-Party and the multinationals located on Chinese territory being recognized as the large investors;

mC - mid-sized capital of zonal reach;

Ci - capital invested by small investors, capital constituting the resources that provide a safety belt for the company/enterprise where the anonymous employee opts to invest his available resources, these amounts-investments may be deposited either at the business where that "investor" is employed, or at other companies deemed to be profitable; is it something similar to the "shares" of the Romanian socialist model in the latter years of Communist leadership.


The subject of labour - the sources of raw materials indispensable for the resumption of the activity cycle;

Means of work - a generic term defining the entire logistics of the activity cycle in question;

LF (HR) - human resources, in all types of positions and all the qualifications required for the proper functioning of the activity cycle in all companies, irrespective of their size or ownership;

Profit - the degree of profitability of investments, to which all categories of workers have access (this is the meaning of the curved arrows), depending on the size of each of their contribution to the size of the initial capital invested. In fact, the originality of the Chinese model consists precisely in this segment that makes it attractive to insiders. The difference compared to the Western model is the fact that the Large Investor in Chinese economy remains the State-Party, whose authority makes it impossible to haemorrhage capital; even Multinationals are monitored to be prevented from fraud or from recruiting domestic (Chinese) allies beyond the limits of strictly partnership-type obligations.

This economic model functions, obviously, within the social space of Chinese society, in which social integration is strictly correlated with professional integration, by virtue of the obligation of each social actor to contribute to the general development of the country, according to the potential of his profession. Intuitively, in the sphere of the country's social space, the ratio between *the labour universe, the global social system and social division of labour* can be presented as shown in the figure below.



In this diagram of the relationship between the four sectors of activity², it is revealed that the community reforming of the social space, and changes in

² The primary sector comprises the totality of energy resources and agriculture; the secondary sector includes all types of activities centered on processing branches; the tertiary sector encompasses all types of services. In developed countries, the tertiary sector is the one that has the highest occupancy: a country's development level, among other

the ratios in the labour universe or in the distribution of human resources (labour) in terms of territory, cannot have adverse consequences on individuals or professions, nor can they determine social marginalization or social exclusion phenomena. The dynamics of continuous development, reflected in continuous economic growth, provide a permanent increase of necessary manpower, but periodic imbalances between sectors are managed by financing retraining according to the new skills required by the emergence of new professions. This explains the fact that unemployment is almost non-existent in so large a population. The logic of the operation of this mechanism is simple: since labour (i.e. any consumption of socially useful power, social action in the broad sense of the word) is the act of social identity for all members of a social system, its exercise in the concrete horizon of a freely chosen profession may lead to various movements within the social space, but not *jobless* moments or situations (loss of a job followed by lengthy unemployment). Each individual, according to his scientific and cultural knowledge and his practical and operative skills, has a place in society reserved as a strategic objective of his socialization. On this praxiological segment, professionalization and apprenticeship at the core values of the professional option and apprenticeship at the defining values of the social system, define the various stages and levels of social and professional integration, because professional integration is a form of social³ integration.

The intuitive figure of the x-ray of the human resources' (workforce) sectors of employment reveals, through the two-way relations between sectors, primarily the cohesion of the community social space, focused on an end desirable for the whole of society: namely, the reconfiguration of the educational and training supply of the labour resource according to the immanent dynamics of the labour market. The vectors that exceed the internal social space signify the fact that the Chinese social relations with the regional and international social space are also carried out directly, by the authorities in the relevant social and occupational sector, in complementarity with similar relations also carried out by the government authorities (the state). Thus, party and state authorities not only enable freedom of the sectors, through public or private actors, to regional and international relations, but they also facilitate the cultivation and diversification of these relations to the extent that they contribute effectively to the affirmation of the principles of "openness" and they produce development.

quality parameters, also includes the share of employment in services of the total employed population in any country in the world; the quaternary sector is the generic term whereby all occupations relating to the ongoing computerization and automation process are defined.

³ Integration is the final sequence of socialization.

To understand this "x-ray" of the economic mechanism of the Chinese social space in the figure above in a more nuanced way, note that after the introduction of the "popular power" under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the community space's structural changes have focused on the nationalization of the economy in compatibility with the "popular" contents of the new regime, i.e. with the *country project of the ruling people's alliance* (labourers-farmers + the intelligentsia loyal to Chinese values). Accordingly, there was a wide-scale movement towards associative structures in agriculture, focused on the eradication of⁴ poverty through labour, each individual being forced to carry out a socially useful activity, in accordance with his training; those who had no training were, mandatorily, included within vocational training courses and literacy classes, all free, that is, being funded by the Government of the young *People's Republic* (October 1st, 1949). After about two decades of integrated nationalization and its management, the mostly catastrophic results of the Great Leap forward (1957-1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1968), the focus has gone from communal cooperatives to family forms of agricultural production, according to the program of "reform and openness" promoted by Deng Xiaoping (1978), but without liquidating those associative forms which have been shown to be cost-effective both in terms of the price of the products, and of the wages for the agricultural workers that were increasingly more specialized as result of a coherent training program for the "labour force" in the agricultural field (vegetables, horticulture, forestry, grain, seed crops, etc.).

Industry, with all its branches, has followed the same course of subordination toward the "superior interests of the party and the state", but focused on the selective assimilation, from technologically advanced economies, of only those components which served the practical realization of Popular China's global country project⁵, the costs of industrialization being obtained without the use of credit instruments, until 1978; after this historic milestone, pursuant to the objectives of the program of "reform and openness", the People's Bank of China has supported, by its specific contribution, the continuation of the strategic development programs of the territories remaining under the jurisdiction of China's Communist authorities. In this context, the first "joint ventures" were started, both on the territory of mainland China, as well as on its islands, and investors from Taiwan and Hong

⁴ China did not engage in European-type social security; the real social security was considered the provision of a job, in order to empower each individual over his own situation in this manner, the expectation of state aid being deemed damaging to the economy and undignified!

⁵ See Deng Xiaoping, *Reform and openness* (party documents), 1978

Kong⁶ were authorized to begin investing in mainland China under the condition of complying with legislation promoted by the country's Communist authorities, in accordance with the principle of "one country, two systems", as a result of negotiations based on the premise of the existence of valid dialog partners and of equal rights, refusing any connotation of neocolonialism and any complex of superiority of the capitalist, Western-style model! In terms of land, China did not promote a regulatory framework allowing for the purchase of land by foreigners; all Chinese land is the property of the state/party and only a specific land area can be leased, on the basis of special partnership agreements.

For healthy financial movements, the Popular Bank has been given increased duties in the support of the project focused on providing "decent well-being for the whole people". On these coordinates, this issue was not presented in the populist sense of the equality among social classes or social homogenization, but the traditional differences of the multi-millennial social stratification were respected, embodied through each individual's right to progress at his own pace, but under the same, non-discriminatory conditions: the project "society for all" was undertaken as a "society that is built through everyone's contribution". The motivating factor that was used was domestic tradition, completely avoiding any type of "institutional bovarysm". In this way, after nearly four decades of proportional development of the entire community space at the highest economic growth rates, China achieved, in 2015, the biggest economic surplus on a worldwide scale, becoming the largest creditor in the world.

Currently (2016), China's infrastructure (design and construction through its own effort) certifies the most complex fully functional endowment, both on land, in the aerospace field, and for the bridges and highways linking the Chinese mainland to the islands which are part of its national territory; the quality of this structure, the Chinese-made rail network, equipped with high-speed trains at the latest standard, and the internally manufactured subway system are other arguments to show that its economy, as the a socialist market economy, is functional and enabled sustainable growth without making use of the managerial stereotypes typical of the Western model, from which it has, nevertheless, drawn inspiration to some extent.

The program of "reform and openness" launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, and valid to this day, has been designed on a few praxiological dimensions, of which we note:

- *The construction of the economic mechanisms of development for the people within the regulatory frameworks of the system of "market economy specific to socialism".* In this context, China has provided an example of

⁶ The price of labor was \$4 per hour in Hong Kong, while in mainland China it was only 50 cents per hour! Here's what the "intelligence" of capitalist investors consisted of!

historical creativity by mixing the viable elements from both the market economy-type capitalism model, and from the socialism model based on the long-term planning of the evolution of its social space.

- The construction of the market system specific to Chinese socialism is focused on: development of public property at the same time with encouraging and supporting non-public economy, by providing equal protection of their rights of ownership - as economies under diverse ownership complete equally and stimulate each other - the development of multiple forms of collective and corporatist economy, stimulating the development of individual economy and private economy, as well as that of small and medium enterprises.
- Creation of a mechanism for adjusting macro-economic development at the national level, to contribute to "building an innovative-type society".
- The establishment of family responsibilities in agriculture, given that the state helps the farmers both in the supply of raw materials, fertilizers and others, as well as in the disposal of production. The focus will be on creating an effective long-term mechanism, whereby industry stimulates the development of agriculture, cities will drive the progress of villages, the achievement of economic and social development of cities, stepping up the construction of infrastructure in rural areas, the development of the rural market and the service network for agriculture. It will act to stabilize and improve the relations pertaining to working the land through leasing, on the basis of law and in accordance with the principles of free consent and of appropriate compensation.
- The "outward" openness of higher education centred on five major objectives: 1) development of universities, in conjunction with their obligation to contribute to the development of the country; 2) encouraging all areas to support the development of higher education; 3) permanent optimization of the distributions of resources related to higher education according to their contribution to the development of the Chinese social space; 4) developing modern computer science as a tool for national development; 5) selective assimilation of scientific, teaching, educational and managerial experiments from developed countries of the world, only if they are compatible with China's development projects.⁷

In this context, we shall mention another objective: strengthening the *Hanban* Foundation which coordinates the Confucius Institutes located worldwide.

⁷ Currently, around 170,000 foreign students study in China and 180,000 Chinese students study in all countries with which it has cooperative relations only multiple levels, not only with the Government in Beijing, but also directly, with Chinese universities that have academic partnerships with universities in third countries.

- Promoting the correlated development of regions and optimizing the state of the capitalization of the country's territory: active support of the development of the Eastern Region and encouraging it to stimulate the development of the Central and Western Regions.
- In the area of industry all state-owned enterprises will be converted to *joint stock companies*, without having to undertake a privatization policy (by sale) of the State patrimony, *through the operation of the difference between the ownership right and the management right*, openness towards foreign investors will be allowed only through the right to manage, namely by the transfer of management, without involving a hypothetical ownership right. In the future, China will go down *the road of a new type of industrialization specific to China*, which will rely mainly on scientific and technical progress, promoting the merging of informatization and industrialization, on stimulating the transformation of industry from large to powerful, on the development of new branches such as: computer science, bio-engineering, the creation of new materials, aerodynamics and space travel, ocean navigation, increasing the ratio and quality of service, *encouraging the development of large Chinese entrepreneurial corporations, that will have an international competitive force.*
- By comparison, one can see the difference between these strategic goals of a Chinese patriot who cares about his country, and the Government program of Petre Roman (Romania, 1990) focused on the dissolution of everything that was Romanian, under the slogan of "privatization" (by sale), particularly in favour of foreigners, without distinction of the managerial experience which these foreigners would have had, without researching what kind of "investors" they are; with the results we know... This failure to conceive and manage the post-1989 Romania's social space reform must be reported under the category of "don't do it like that!", no matter what "selfless" foreign consultancy will be offered to social reform enthusiasts...
- Coordination of the economic, fiscal, financial, monetary and foreign exchange policies by the Government, based on proposals from the Planning Committee of the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry, for the superior capitalization of all of the country's material, human, technical and financial resources.
- *Maintaining a competitive local and international rating* in order to increase the China's competitiveness in all fields, at the planetary level⁸.
- China does not aspire to the status of a superpower, neither economically, nor on its military component, but aims to build an economy that is

⁸ Florea Dumitrescu, President of the Romanian Association of Friendship with the P.R. of China, in *Evantaiul celor 10.000 de gânduri*, Romania and China, *Trei veacuri de istorie*, Volume III, Bucharest, Puzzle Works Publishers, 2010.

functional at the global level, by the superior capitalization of all of its potential.

- In order to enact these goals, the Chinese Leadership at the time set forth a detailed program of foreign documentation trips of all Chinese responsible authorities, in order to draw inspiration from European experiences; Yugoslavia and Romania were always on the list of those documentation trips, as they were considered less dependent on the Bolshevik model of socialism. After a few years, as a result of pragmatic lobbying, Hungary was also included in this documentation program...

At the macro-social level, *the Chinese social space, in accordance with these strategic objectives, has been decentralized, in terms of managerial authority, into four special zones, in 1979, on the East Coast, more precisely in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, as follows: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, areas that have received, without exceeding the area of state sovereignty, managerial-type powers to undertake large cooperative experiences and productive contacts with companies from many foreign countries*⁹. In this context, note that *this type of delegation of authority differs at least in two aspects from the frequently invoked "regionalization" circulated by various Government formulas in post-1989 Romania:*

1. It is not a regionalization in the territorial sense, China's territory being indivisible and under the sole authority of the State (Government) and the Chinese Communist Party.
2. *Delegation of authority has been operated solely on the managerial dimension, i.e. only to explore, with the status of a pilot project, alternative ways of resolute management of sustainable development issues, but not in the sense of Western-style market economy, i.e. through social polarization, but by focusing on reducing the asymmetries of quality of life in all segments of the population, with a view to ensuring a "decent civilization for the whole people" through the identification of resources for development to benefit all sections of the population. In these areas, taxes have been cut in half, and import duties waived.* Starting from the successful experiment in these special areas, the 'New open door strategy', formulated by Deng Xiaoping was drawn up, that, since 1978, stated that: "If we close our doors and insulate ourselves again, we will be unable to reach the same level as that of developed countries, over the next fifty years". Here's *an example of flexibility and pragmatism: the principle of the*

⁹ The Honh Kong-Shenzen-Guangzu-Zhuhai-Macao-Delta Zhujiang mega-region is projected to become one of the most important areas of development for the whole of the twenty-first century, and the region of Shanghai, began, with government support, in the 90s of the last century, building a business region, in order to become an financial and service center, with its capital at Pudong.

eradication of poverty cannot be achieved only with the enthusiasm of the poor, but it should be merged with the experience of producing wealth by those who have already produced it, but without forgetting a crucial detail, namely that of dissemination of wealth for all! Here is the source of the loyalty of the masses towards the new elites, be they Communist and criticized by all the rich of the world...

Can this be a new standard for the "Business ethics" frequently invoked in Western theories?

Why not ?!

In this context, a clarification is opportune: the anti-communist rhetoric of capitalists who began to borrow from Communist China deserves a severe analysis even according to the capitalist criteria of profit in a competitive world, in which those very capitalists imposed prohibitive rules for those who can produce at more attractive prices than their traditional, capitalist world companies.

For now, the Romanian companies, for example, are not competing in the tractor export market, because the engineer Petre Roman, the first "post-revolutionary" prime-minister liquidated the production of tractors both in Romania, but also the production of all other foreign companies that were partnered in the production and export of tractors. How can one conceive sustainable development without these institutional actors? Multinationals will draw much more capital, but in breach of their own principle, that of free competition, with which they have inflamed the horizons of expectation of millions of citizens outside of the "market economy" which has brought about prosperity. It is very true; just for some. Namely, for those who have all the levers of power...

Another parameter, very important for the identity profile of the Chinese model is the assumption of the traditions of ranking the cities on China's territory; on the board of the national urbanization, every city today holds a role according to its historic status and the multi-millennial prestige scale promoted in the Chinese collective mindset. Thus, the top of the pyramid is held by capital cities, with the apex being Pekin, Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, followed by provincial cities of regional importance, then cities without any administrative role, cities of local relevance, local fairs, and lastly insulated cities; from this hierarchical ranking of cities stems the perception of the urban community in question to provide a satisfactory framework in terms of social, educational and medical services, based on the same nationally valid principles. This ranking is an attempt to link the present with the tradition of its own imperial past, a period during which cities in imperial China were ranked according to political and strategic imperatives, and power was exhibited by a pomp corresponding to each city's ranking in the general hierarchy of urban comfort and its importance relative to imperial power. In this context of

recovering imperial traditions, the current regulations do not enable families to change their place of residence to resettle in a city with a higher status than the one they are currently residing in; on the other hand, opposite movements are allowed, and downward resettlements are even encouraged.

What characterizes Chinese society is the presence of a single hierarchy of status, applicable to society as a whole, starting from the capital down to small fair towns (Martin Whyte and William Parish, 1984¹⁰), with a very important consequence in civic terms: it inoculates the idea of social justice in the sense that every individual is equal in the face of a common tradition of respect to community rules legitimized over millennia, social life in the communist present being ritualized according to ancestral norms, modernized based on the Chinese conception of modernity, rather than rationalized based on the European or American concept of rationality and rationalizing. In this sense, in the work *"Canton under communism"*¹¹, Martin Whyte and William Parish, speaking about modernizing the hierarchy, consider that the hierarchy, the cult of the ancestors, family and continuity can variables of the Communist neo-traditionalism promoted at the level of state policy in *"contemporary China that is neither socialist, nor modern, Confucian, but simply diverse, marked by innumerable inequalities (between different sectors of society, between city and village, between villages, between families always attached only to what is useful, but according to what is appropriate according to present standards), in short, a living society, one able to continually update its own identity regarding Maoism and regarding its own traditional past, but without completely ignoring in axiological terms"*. However, *"contemporary China society really is a new, Communist, modern society, but it became so by superior capitalization of its traditional behaviours"*.

3. Conclusions

In conclusion, if after changing the regime of operation of the Chinese social space, the transition from feudalism to capitalism has not provided the necessary time for structuring a capitalist system perceived by the Chinese territorial communities as a replacement of an unattractive social system due to feudal-type social polarization, by another kind of social polarization (capitalism), historical urgency has radicalized the option of exploring other ways to establish a different kind of social and national justice, and offered a

¹⁰ See Martin King Whyte, William L, Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China*, Chicago University Press, 1984, 415 p. (A unique study of urban life in China during the last decade of the leadership of Mao Tsedun, during which the Chinese have managed to avoid the universal drawbacks of urbanism).

¹¹ See Martin King Whyte, William L, Parish, *Canton Under Communism*, Harper and Row, New York, 1967.

chance for Marxism to attract the Chinese reformers of that time. Their inspiration from the ideas of equality, popular democracy and elimination of class privileges of Marxism, centring on the political-philosophical doctrine *has operated on traditional Chinese structures, rather than on the Leninist paradigm of a socialist revolution, which not even Maoists accepted wholly as the slogan of their struggle to establish a society placed in service to "the people"*.

This aspect is of decisive importance for those who want to undertake lucid and responsible analyses on the evolution of a society that has gone from structures close to feudalism to the standard of a great economic power, able to design, build and maintain an industry of the highest level: at the time of completion of this study, China has launched ten cosmonauts into outer space, through its own resources of scientific research and technological development. Any comments must absolutely start from these realities; the ideological connotations, regardless of what side they may be on, cannot have any value without the practical results to confirm them!

Thus, through complementing the historically validated procedural sequences of the *socialist* experiment (designing the construction of long-term economic growth, increasing authority of the national State as an actor in international relations, free education, free medical care, the transformation of the education system and scientific research into tools for national development), with the performance of *capitalism* (the role of the free market in price formation, the free press, independence of education from politics, strengthening the institutional mechanisms of the rule of law), popular China created an original macro-social management system and a global development strategy which may bear the name of "*socialist market economy*". This is the 3rd millennium China's country *brand*.

This identity profile that individualizes contemporary China includes, axiologically, the millennia of wisdom from Confucius to present day, and the initiatives of some Western analysts stating that today, a "Confucian democracy" has been instated, only represent laughable attempts to deride the originality of a model that was economically successful, without indebting itself to the international competent (capitalist) bodies. If Romania was punished for daring to "allow" itself to extinguish its foreign debt simultaneously with the continuation of national development projects, it is assumed that the achievements of third countries, without their dependence on capital from the world financial bodies, cannot be seen with approval; even more so as these countries are likely to have a different development model than the capitalist one. Neo-liberalism, valid for the first half of the 20th century in Europe and America, has exhausted its historical creation ability and its ability to adapt to new realities, as countries such as Italy or France, traditionally belonging to the G7 Group (most industrialized countries of the world), currently cannot

continue their development projects unless they permanently raise their indebtedness cap. The logic of colonial type development is no longer productive for now, but it is definitely inadvisable for the future of human society.

The countries subscribing to the Western development model have practiced social macro-management based on the principle “the least state”, namely the transfer of authority (through privatization/sale) from the state, as the main decision-making body, to private economic agents, namely to agents of the size of multinationals¹², while the Chinese experience reveals the importance of consolidating the sole authority of the state as the main actor in domestic and international relations, and the leadership of the Communist Party is only the guarantor of the defence of the Chinese community’s overall national interests, in relation to all types of institutions, including in relation to the exclusiveness of multinationals present in China's economy. So: *not the diminishing of national authority, but its stability and strengthening ensures sustainable and long term development* - it is the trend of the reforms of the contemporary Chinese social space and the management philosophy of Communist China. It is possible that some politicians in the wider world do not agree with this philosophy, but the pragmatism of this direction, which deserves study as an optimization vector of the human condition for the present and, above all, for the future of Humanity, cannot be denied.

One other collective mindset parameter that singles out the Chinese community should not be downplayed: the *focus on harnessing collective intelligence*. Thus, unlike the Western-style mentality in which the focus is on individual intelligence, competition focusing on the establishment of ranks (example: the best footballer of all time, the richest man of the year etc. etc.), *in the multi-millennium Chinese practice, the concerns have focused on bringing together individual intelligences which, together, have developed high skills and impressive creative capabilities*; summed up historically, these synergies have borne the fruits of today. This issue deserves another, more in-depth study.

In fact, organizational sociology studies¹³ have demonstrated that the pilot projects in which children with exceptional qualities were made to interact have boosted not only the group’s performance, but also the potential of individual evolution. Here is the lesson that we can draw from this: left among the mediocre, the gifted or overly-gifted ones also get lost in anonymity!

¹² The fact that profits no longer reach the Governments, but remain with the managers of multinationals, explains the galloping debt of developed capitalist states (as well as of those who have recently adopted this Western development model!), forced to find exogenous external resources for health-care, culture, education, defense, etc. Multinationals have as their sole purpose the production and repatriation of profit, not financing the budgetary sectors of that country!

¹³ Ștefan Buzărnescu: *summer internship in the 1994-1997 academic year*.

Sustainable development (sustainable, as Westerners say) is possible only through collective participation of all community members through a permanent "apprenticeship" of the production of prosperity next to those who produced it already.

Such a practice is common in the Chinese decision-making innovation of today: new ideas, proposed as a vector of change, are experimented first on the level of pilot units, and if the results are good, the experiment is adopted to be generalized for all pertinent institutions in the Chinese social space. If the results are skewed compared to the working assumptions, social research examines the causes of failure and explore alternative solutions within the scope of the same objective, focused initially on finding sources of "prosperity for all". Basic research provides a sociological modelling of the dynamics of the social space in conjunction with applied research and the actual management and decision-making practice.

In this regard, scientific research can function a "tool of national development", not as a source of profit exclusively for multinationals, as is happening in the logic of the Western development model, based on the privatization of all branches of the economy and all types of services. The Chinese motto "one country-two systems" materializes in the form of complementarity between the state sector, controlled by the central authority of the state-party, and the private sector, consisting of a multitude of private associations, but under the common jurisdiction of the Chinese State. The onset of the ninth decade of the last century surprised the developed world with yet another social innovation: The Government has selected 157 enterprises that, with state support, would become Chinese multinationals with the mission to make large-scale investments on all continents, a goal that at present has been achieved. On the same coordinates, during the 14th Congress of Chinese Communists (1992), "building a socialist market economy" was established as a strategic objective, which is operational in the most immediate present. The identity profile of the Chinese development model is clear for those who look at the dynamics of the contemporary social space without prejudice.

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