

REFUGEE CRISIS IN LESBOS AS A STATE AND A STATE-CORPORATE CRIME

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Abstract: *The critical criminological thought can and has to discuss on the relation between crime and migration issues. By invalidating the myths that constitute common rhetoric in political and media analysis—through which repression policies become stricter and stricter-state crime, the crimes of bodies of official and unofficial social control against refugee and immigrant populations and state-corporate crimes are coming into light. A fundamental question arising is whether or not the planned or enforced State policies can become or are the real crime. The present article first makes some theoretical assumptions on the issue of State crimes against migrant populations and state corporate crime and then seeks to examine the application of those theories in practice through a case study: the recent refugee crisis in Lesbos.*

Key words: *migration; refugee; crime; state; criminology.*

1. Migration and the role of critical criminology

The critical criminological discourse should ask questions concerning the root of the problem and not the superficial empirical explanation of the connection between criminal pathogenicity and population displacement. Looking for a structural reality brings us in front of the assumption that the State institutions of formal social control define and address crime, legalizing retrospectively these options, by using as an excuse both the ratio of the media and the specialized scientific discourse. Especially, the issue of connecting moving populations and crime has developed a wave of misunderstanding, which is reflected in conventional criminological researches, and is also reproduced and maintained in the wider society through the fear of victimization. Quantitative researches of “gangs” of migrants (White et al., 1999; Collins et al., 2000) and over-representation of migrants in crime are considered statistically unreliable, since one cannot prove a direct causal relationship (Mukherjee, 1999). In addition, they do not take into account the over policing of migrant populations and discrimination against them deriving from the mechanisms of justice (Cunnen, 1995). Furthermore, such a ratio is maintained almost two centuries, as shown in the research of Pearson (1983) for England in the 19th century and Gleeson (2004) for Australia at the end of the century, culminating

in the researches of the School of Chicago in the first half of the twentieth century, and guided much of the subsequent U.S. research and theory (Taylor et al., 1973).

The critical criminological discourse is not only criticizing the continuous production of relevant research findings. It raises questions such as, why the state operates selectively in order to define an act as criminal by setting aside other operations that cause social harm, many of which are produced by the state and its institutions in the expense of displaced populations? Questions like the following are highlighted by the “new criminology” thinking: Why are immigrants and refugees over-represented in official victimology statistics (Poynting, 2008)? Why crimes against migrants are not recorded by official agencies of social control and are not treated the same way with crimes against victims who are non-immigrants (Poynting and Noble, 2004)? Why the state does not face the same way accidents (sometimes fatal) with immigrant victims (Tombs, 2007; Hocking and Guy, 2008)?

Especially on the issue of refugees and asylum seekers, the critical criminological discourse has started to ask questions such as why the “developed” countries with a lower number of refugees (in relation to the “developing”) are characterized by the most as oppressive and repressive policies (Pickering, 2008)? Why the policies carried at borders by the official social control oppress human rights without relying on international agreements and laws (Wonders, 2006)? How some specific governmental policies target refugees as a vulnerable population causing social damage and revealing the failure of the state welfare systems (Crawly, 2001; Hathaway, 1991)?

The critical criminological discourse has begun and needs to manifest interest in highlighting the issue of crimes of the state against refugee populations. The act of the entrance of a migrant into a country is automatically been characterized as illegal, without even the recognition of the basic rights recognized by the criminal law procedure. We put forward the following general research hypotheses:

- How the structure, function and specific practices that take place in detention centers (such as prolonged detention, living conditions, the response by the agencies of formal social control, and methods such as body control) cause harm to detainees (Silove et al., 2000), with special reference to unaccompanied minors (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2004) and in private detention centers (Pickering, 2008).
- How non-repressive policies, as part of a welfare policy, cause problems of exclusion from health services, education, employment, etc., by essentially preventing the enforcement of announcements concerning integration/inclusion and attain these people as outsiders, making them vulnerable to the operation of formal social control (Esmaelli and Wells, 2000; Fitzpatrick, 1999; Fitzpatrick, 2000, Gibney, 2000).
- By what means does the policing at the border operate and if the border control is not simply a response to uncontrolled movement of migrant

groups, but an ongoing process (Weber, 2006) which changes the character of the border, and reconstructs the nature of structural powers beyond established and recorded in official legal documents formalities of national sovereignty, international relations and universal human rights (Aas, 2011). In this problematic area issues of the surveillance of the body are brought, and body can be an identity that can serve as key access (or exclusion from) modern society (Aas, 2006).

Concerning the Greek reality, and according to what is mentioned above, the question of how a formal migration and refugee policy, determines the terms “deviation” and “crime”, in relation to migrant populations, should be clarified in a historical and social context. Special emphasis should be given on the fact that terms and control bodies are used that have been developed in the early twentieth century in order to reproduce the police of non-assimilation and illegal immigration (Georgoulas, 2009).

In terms of a scientific approach to this phenomenon there is a need to put specific research questions concerning the crimes of the state against migrants, by participating in the above mentioned critical criminological debate, and respond by presenting a case study, which also aims to initiate a future criminological research orientation in Greece.

A first attempt was published in 2013 about another case study, the Refugees and Immigrants Detention Center of Pagani in Lesbos. Seeking to study more effectively crime policies on migrant populations in Greece a participant observation took place from April 2009 to March 2010 in Pagani detention center located near the town Mytilene at Lesbos. Our research was about living conditions, the role of the Greek police and detainees’ rights (police violence, the right to be informed, communication of the detainees with people of their choice, protecting health of the detainees), arrests in the sea – testimonies, the detention of asylum seekers and the discouragement by the authorities for making an asylum application and the detention of unaccompanied minors. Our main question was related to the need for the critical criminological reason to manifest interest and highlight the issue of crimes of the State against migrant populations. We gave particular emphasis to the question of how the structure, function and specific practices that take place in detention centers (such as long detention, living conditions, treatment by the agencies of formal social control etc.) are causing harm to the detained populations, and become, ultimately, a hidden, non-treatable, but substantially the real crime (Georgoulas and Sarantidis, 2013).

2. About state-corporate crime

In recent years the international academic community has made an effort to define and scientifically test the term “state-corporate crime” that may replace and be more specific than the term “white collar crime”. It is a term that, from a political

and a research point of view, corresponds to what we narrow it down as “corruption”, but with two important differences:

The first difference lies in that there is an effort to criminalize this act from the point of view of protecting human rights and social harms. Crimes are not only the known “street crimes”, but these acts as such, which, according to studies, involve much more loss of life, physical or other harm, loss of property, money, from respective registered murders, attempted murders, theft-robbery, etc. The need for criminalization of these acts is connected both with the need for appropriate orientation of formal criminal policy (law, police, administration of justice) and for the awareness of citizens, consumers, workers and social movements.

The second difference lies in the revelation of the true nature of this crime and thus in the orientation not only of crime prevention but also of political and social action. The interdependence of the state and corporate capital, either by converting directly public money into private (i.e. contracts) or by providing facilities and specific policies (i.e. laws, decrees, etc.) is the way that the heart of our capitalist society operates and therefore the root of this crime.

The term state-corporate crime is not a neutral term, from an evaluative perspective, but rather a product of a very clear politico-ideological decision against a theoretical dilemma that is created by the historical tradition of criminological theory and research, and the prospects in judicio-political and social field that are opened by this specific research.

The concept of state-corporate crime has just gone the third decade of its first public appearance in a scientific text, while its use - as it has not become commonplace among scholars remains quantitatively limited. It was launched through a series of presentations at conferences by Kramer and Kramer and Michalowski in 1990, in which the first written version was introduced in 1992 (Kramer, 1992) and concerned a case study. The general idea was that there should be particular emphasis on the field of the state and businesses interaction that produces serious criminality and not to be examined separately as it had usually been treated until then, that is, as state crime and as corporate crime.

According to what has just mentioned Michalowski and Kramer (2006) gave a comprehensive definition of state-corporate crime as follows: illegal or socially harmful actions produced by a mutually strengthened interaction between policies or practices of political institutions of governance and those of economic production and distribution.

The research carried out within this context use case studies, employing secondary data from official documents and records or from investigative journalism (Kauzlarich and Mathews, 2006), whereas the analysis that is usually at a micro-sociological level lacks a “pure evil perpetrator” as it involves complex organizational arrangements that make the motives and purposes of government and business entities involved inconspicuous (Liederbach, 2010). This very important crime, because it relates to human rights violations, is a systemic problem and not the result

of individual actions, and just as such it is defined as (something that is) linked with the ownership or management of a capital accumulation process.

Within this context we could incorporate two complementary dimensions, when we talk about political ties of governance and institutions of economic production and distribution: first, major multinational companies and supranational government organizations and, second, institutions of “civil society”, that is, non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

More analytically, Friedrichs and Friedrichs (2002) mention the “crimes of globalization”, thus providing another interesting dimension to the issue. These crimes refer to forms of social harm to entire populations from political supranational institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. The imposition of the top-down policies and economic programmes that are consistent with the interests of powerful countries and multinational companies have effects on and even cause casualties in human lives mainly in “developing countries” (Rothe et al., 2006). Usually, such things as “Debt Repayment” programmes lead, as Green and Ward (2004) have shown us, to political instability, then to paternalistic or clientelism systems of governance that are the nest of the organized crime, corruption, authoritarianism, state repression (Georgoulas and Voulvouli, 2015), use of torture, and even of possible genocide.

This globalization and its crimes refer to the influence not only of supranational financial institutions and multinational companies but also of NGOs (Chace-Dunn et al., 2000; Mazlish, 1999). In the neocolonial situation or the postcolonial state, as called by Gupta (1995), where we have been living, there is a continuum between businesses, the state and the “civil society” that in essence makes the boundaries between them blurring; the continuous interaction that eliminates autonomy and the limits that are a “normal” situation that have been neglected in literature.

Even more in the period of modern economic crisis, the contraction of welfare state intervention leads to further involvement of NGOs to meet these needs. But the change is not only quantitative but also qualitative. As a consequence of this change and the increase in NGOs’ role as a mere provider of social services, there have been the marginalization of the contenders of actions of such organizations and the weakening of features such as the proximity to local communities, the mobilization of citizens and lobbying for changes in targeting policies (Simiti, 2014). However, this development does not signal the strengthening of civil society; it rather signals the incorporation of the existing agencies, which will ultimately survive the economic crisis, within a context that will be distinguishable for deference of retreating from self-expression and promoting social demands.

On the contrary, these NGO-intermediaries reproduce the features of traditional charity (e.g. disconnection of the aid provided from empowerment actions of beneficiaries, disconnection of individual needs from social needs, emphasis on moral obligation, promotion of donors) (Simiti, 2014), while at the same

time the development of clientelism between specific organizations and the central or local political power favoured the appearance of cases of corruption or financial mismanagement, as several relevant publications have shown (Gibelman and Gelman, 2001; Greenlee et al., 2007).

3. Migration to the Aegean islands the last years

In the summer of 2015 some of the Aegean Islands (mainly *Lesbos, Chios, Kos, Leros, Samos*) received a huge influx of refugees, which by far exceeded existing capabilities in reception and hospitality. Typically, only last July Lesbos received nearly 55,000 refugees/migrants, while the number of arrivals on the island in 2014 was almost 12,000 and in 2013 less than 4,000 refugees/migrants¹.

It was a real humanitarian crisis, a situation that could have led to an unprecedented tragedy if hundreds of volunteers hadn't been mobilized and hadn't offered their unconditional and continuous solidarity to those who come from war zones across the Middle East, Central and Southern Asia and North Africa and were heading towards Europe.

Meanwhile, the painful events that have been unfolding in countries of the Balkan Peninsula and Central Europe, and the ensuing urgency for "handling" the great refugee flows to northern Europe, seem to have led the EU to a new strategy of "refugee management". This development does not bode anything good for the future. The main objective of this strategy is to dramatically decrease the refugee / migrant flows, and for this purpose the so-called "Fortress Europe" should be reinforced.

This goal is served by specific and centrally planned European policies that are to: (a) make a clear distinction between "refugees" and "migrants"; (b) strengthen FRONTEX, and the forces that deter sea travel as well as to "militarize" sea borders both in the Aegean and the wider Mediterranean Sea; (c) create "hotspots" on the Aegean islands and elsewhere, aiming at an administratively effective separation between refugees and migrants; and (d) to appoint Turkey as the regional "policeman" so that deterrence policies are strengthened and crossing the waterways in the Aegean Sea can be discouraged. Thus, it becomes conspicuous that the EU, in the face of the huge humanitarian crisis with victims hundreds of thousands of refugees/ migrants, has chosen to stick to the hard logic of previous years, that is, (a) the logic of a hermetically "sealed" fortress that allows a very small and targeted number of persecuted people from war-ridden countries in Africa and Asia to come to the European land; and (b) the logic of these people's assimilation and their direct incorporation into the cheap labor market (of Germany and other countries) as a "reserve army of labour".

¹http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories/2014/statistics14/allod204/statistics_all_2014_methorio.pdf. (accessed: May 2019)

At the same time, drastic cuts in funding for food and health programmes by international organizations (e.g. the United Nations High Commission for Refugees) has worsened the already critical situation of refugees throughout the Middle East, and will surely create even larger refugee flows into Europe²

Furthermore, the distinction between “refugees” and “migrants” has been proven completely groundless, since it is based on an outdated conception of geopolitical reality that ignores contemporary developments. Nowadays, wars have completely different characteristics compared to those in the 1950s, a period during which it was defined administratively what constitutes a “refugee” or a “migrant” at an international level. How can one classify (and handle) as “economic migrants” people who, under the burden of war and terrorist threats, experience the fear of persecution, starvation, extermination, or simply do not possess the necessary means to educate their children? By what criteria a person coming from Afghanistan or Iraq is not a “refugee”, but only an “economic migrant”? Who defines the content and limits of an unbearable life? Does the guilt of the EU's leadership make it forget very easily how long-lasting are the consequences of wars and other conflicts that Europe itself had instigated? How can people's efforts to take refuge to other countries, hoping for a sustainable life, be divided between “documented avoidance of risking death or persecution”, on the one hand, and “improving their living standards”, on the other hand?

Who decides who will live and who will die, either within their countries or in the “civilized West”? Who holds the power of life and death over the persecuted of this planet? Shouldn't various clichés terms found in international law regarding the status of refugees, such as “well-founded fear of persecution” make us reflect on and try to define what “fear”, “justified fear” and “persecution” mean for those who experience those extreme situations? Who gives the right to the EU to decide which *countries, nationalities* and *ethnic groups* may be excluded from the “refugee” status, implying that the members of the respective population groups are not entitled to feel unbearable conditions of life in the countries of origin? How can whole populations be collectively identified as “economic migrants” but not as “refugees”, even when the existing refugee law prescribes that the procedures for recognition of a “refugee” status should take into account the special conditions of each individual (likelihood of persecution), and this recognition is, above all, a humanitarian act?

Such a policy is a state crime, a violation of human rights. According to Amnesty International report for Greece (2015-6)³, the dramatic increase in arrivals of asylum seekers and irregular migrants on the Aegean islands pushed an ineffective

²<http://www.unhcr.gr/nea/artikel/cee62eadb22d1a47dda45b5a49f9bda7/ypati-armosteia-oie.html>.

³ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/greece/report-greece/> (accessed: May 2019)

first reception system beyond breaking point. Allegations of torture and other ill-treatment and excessive use of force by police persisted.

More analytically:

- More than 612 people, including many children, died or were unaccounted for in the crossing when the boats carrying them capsized.
- Several refugees and asylum-seekers reported instances of violent push-backs. Push-backs also continued at sea. Eleven push-back incidents were reported to have occurred at the Greek-Turkish land and sea borders (from November 2014 till the end of August 2015).
- The already ineffective first reception system proved incapable of adequate responding to the dramatic increase in refugees and migrants arriving on the Aegean islands
- Reception conditions on islands such as Lesbos and Kos were inhuman... insufficient tents, lack of food and poor hygiene conditions
- Unaccompanied children were often held with adults and remained in detention for several weeks under poor conditions. Conditions in immigration detention areas, including police stations, often amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment.
- Obstacles to accessing asylum procedures remained for both detained and non-detained asylum-seekers.
- On several occasions between August and October, riot police on Lesbos reportedly used tear gas and beat refugees and migrants waiting to be admitted for screening at the Moria immigration detention Centre and those being registered in Mytilene port.

Furthermore, in visits to Lesbos from April 3 to 9, 2016, Human Rights Watch⁴ found that the police-guarded camp on the island was holding a wide array of people with special needs, including women with young children, pregnant women, unaccompanied children, elderly men and women, and people with physical and psychosocial disabilities. None of the detainees had proper access to health care, sanitation facilities, or legal aid.

The Moria facility on Lesbos, with more than about 4,000 people, is surrounded by fence topped with barbed-wire. Conditions at Moria deteriorated rapidly due to the fear, frustration, over-crowding, and lack of services. When Human Rights Watch came to Moria took some interviews⁵. One detainee interviewed through the fence said he was lucky to sleep in a tent. "This is because I came two weeks ago," he said. "Whoever comes now sleeps outside, and the toilets are really dirty. You go inside and you can't even take a breath. The food is disgusting and the

⁴ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/14/greece-asylum-seekers-locked> (accessed: May 2019)

⁵ Ibidem.

water is dirty. Both me and my friend have skin problems from washing in this water and drinking it.”

Amnesty International⁶, which visited Moria on April 5, 2015, reported that the packed facility was holding people with disabilities, pregnant women, and a large number of children, including a baby with health complications from an attack in Syria. Only three doctors were regularly available to provide medical care.

Nothing changed the following years after the EU- Turkey migration deal (18 March 2016). According to Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2016/7, more than 434 people died or were reported missing while trying to cross the Aegean Sea. Moreover, the deal allowed for those arriving on the Greek islands via Turkey to be returned to Turkey without a substantive examination of their claims. There was evidence that at least eight Syrian refugees were forcibly returned to Turkey. Reception conditions for refugees, asylum –seekers and migrants stranded on the islands were overcrowded and insanity; they provided inadequate security and people faced uncertainty about their future. Those seeking access to asylum procedures met with serious obstacles including being unable to lodge their asylum requests through Skype or only after repeated attempts. Allegations of torture or other ill-treatment during arrest or in immigration detention persisted⁷.

In the evening of 24 November 2016, a gas canister used for cooking in Moria camp exploded and led to the death of a 66-year old Iraqi woman and a 6 year-old child living in the adjoining tent. The child’s mother and 4 year-old sibling sustained serious injuries and were transferred to a hospital in Athens. Two months later the deaths of three men in Moria camp (January 2017) brought home the risks posed by the appalling conditions thousands of asylum-seekers and migrants are enduring: overcrowding, freezing temperatures, lack of hot water and heating, poor hygiene, bad nutrition, inadequate medical care. All due to the organizational failures of the EU-Turkey deal, a deal that European leaders seeing in it a blueprint for new migration deals with other countries but closing their eyes to its flaws, its criminogenic nature (Amnesty International 2017).

4. NGO’s involvement as a state corporate crime

Moreover there have been reported incidents on state- NGO –corporate crime. Let’s describe analytically what happened mainly in Lesbos, concerning the NGO, local authorities’ relationship.

The first phase began in the middle of summer 2015, when dozens of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) massively arrived on Lesbos to support refugees,

⁶ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/04/greece-refugees-detained-in-dire-conditions-amid-rush-to-implement-eu-turkey-deal/> (accessed: May 2019)

⁷ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/greece/report-greece/> (accessed: May 2019)

who were arriving by the thousands on the island on a daily basis. Some NGOs actually contributed to refugees' relief, others used their presence on the island to make a profit. Last August, the journalists who were on Lesbos used to say that it was enough for one to have some photos with refugees from the coast of Lesbos, a website and a bank account so to solve one's financial problem.

It is a lie that the Greek State was caught napping last summer and lost control of refugee flows. The truth is that it knew very well what was happening on Lesbos, Chios, Kos and on other Aegean islands. And there was entire service available that the state could utilize to manage the situation; it is the General Secretariat of the Aegean and Island Policy (former Ministry of the Aegean), a service that knows perfectly the insular Greece. The General Secretariat could have been used from the first time that the problem was raised. It was a conscious choice that the General Secretariat was not used. Besides the NGOs, individuals, employees' associations and political union collectives that were not receiving any funding from anywhere created refugee support structures; they just wanted to help their fellow people.

The next period, which began late September 2015, it was the period during which the recording of NGOs that were based on the islands and in mainland Greece commenced. A series of meetings between state actors, NGOs and local and regional agencies took place. It was the period that the state was preparing for a cleanup. It wanted to banish pesky volunteers, those who are not funded by the state budget or European Union funds because they had the bad habit to talk too much, give information to journalists about refugees' mistreatment and to reveal how government mechanisms were operating; sometimes they gave crucial information to refugees, too!

The third period started in mid-November 2015 and continues till today: the state forced small NGOs to come under the umbrella of larger ones and indirectly or directly threatened them that if they disobeyed they would be forced to leave the country.

It is conspicuous that the refugee issue management tested a new way of how the state was operating. Funds were allocated to NGOs, but they were also able to act as what is called the social state. The official state did not take the responsibility to provide food, housing, clothing, health care to refugees. Thus, it avoided hiring staff, which was necessary to carry out the specific tasks. On the other hand, the NGOs had every chance to move quickly to bring staff and volunteers from abroad, to hire employees from the local unemployed people. Thus, an amalgam of labour relations was formed, including unpaid work, poorly paid work, unpaid overtime, contracts that are renewed every month or every three months. Labour contracts were defaulted, threats made to the employees that if they spoke they could not be able to find work in another NGO. Of course, there have been CEOs who are being paid with monthly salaries of 4,500 euros.

At the same time, the NGOs can solve other issues, such as hiring friends and voters of the government parties, local and regional authorities. Naturally, it is hardly forgotten that there must be compliance with the parliamentary balances in such cases! They can also placate local communities by renting buildings, financing local mass media or certain journalists etc.

That it has been conscious choice of the Greek government to replace the welfare state with a “benevolent” civil society is illustrated by the recent formal legislation to deal with the refugee crisis with Law 4375/2016, Article 11, paragraph 9, which states that “If the effective operation of the Regional Services of Reception and Identification is hindered due to the lack of adequate or appropriate personnel, handling individual processes ... may be assigned for a certain time based on the applicable regulations for public accounting in agencies of civil society that meet appropriate quality and safety standards ... The cost of the award may be covered by the state or co-financed or other resources”. In all the above discussion money is too much and procedures are opaque⁸.

⁸ From my personal experience as a municipal councilor in the Municipality of Lesbos, in constant councils, I have witnessed such events that led me to send the following letter to the relevant Minister:

“Open letter to the Deputy Minister of Migration Policy, Mr. G. Mouzalas, Mytilene, 04/04/2016

Dear Mr. Minister,

I hereby address you, requesting clarification on two important issues on the management of funds of European programmes of the refugee crisis. According to official transcripts of the recordings of meetings of two recent municipal Lesbos councils (which I am attaching you), under the European URBAN programme, Ministry of Migration Policy suggested / recommended actors (specific NGOs and Universities), even the name of a colleague Professor, who will reclaim and manage two programmes, totaling 11.2 million Euros for integration actions for refugees and migrants. As you will see in detail, in the official minutes of the recommendation of the responsible Deputy Mayor, according to which the participation of Lesbos Municipality in the default partnership was requested, there are expressions, such as: “the direct award was required ..”, “We were proposed the name of the Professor ...”, “there was a suggestion for the agencies which were to be involved ...”, “there was guidance from the Ministry”. I would like to ask you whether during the submission of competitive European programmes – funds and before the end of the final filing date, “you guided”, “indicated”, “required”, or “suggested” specific individuals and agencies to form a partnership between public and private sector to claim and manage a very large amount (of money), or, what is officially referred to in the respective municipal councils of Lesbos (March 2016) is false”. This open letter is unanswered, till today.

5. (Not) an epilogue

Nowadays, as far as the refugee issue is concerned, the European continent is confronted with a big dilemma, which entails two opposing perspectives. On the one end, we have the neoliberal alliance of *political* and *economic oligarchy* with *racism* and, sometimes, *fascism*. State crimes and state-corporate crimes are part of this agenda, as illustrated above.

On the other end, we have the forces of *solidarity* to refugees: democratic citizens, ordinary people: the “underdogs” of Europe. Those of us who belong to the *solidarity* side need to fight to prevent the militarization of sea borders and the setting-up of “hotspots” that will decide who will stay and who will return back to a situation of continuous risking of one’s life. At the same time, we are called for fighting both to open up legal and safe migration channels to Europe, and to immediately stop the wars and disasters that cause massive exodus of the civilian population. Uncovering and addressing state crimes and state-corporate crimes is part of this agenda.

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