FAMILY AND RELIGION: TWO FORMS OF ROMANIAN SOCIAL CAPITAL

Cristian NICULA,
PhD Candidate
University of Craiova, Romania
cristian.nicula78@gmail.com

Abstract: *The objective of this article is to emphasize the importance of family and religion from a social perspective in today's Romanian society. As social manifestations, family and religion are perennial forms of human manifestations in general throughout history. The degree, the intensity and the forms in which they crystallize at a certain historical moment in a society put it in the light and offer a comparison term between this and other societies. At present, the research of the relevance that family and religion have in the Romanian society represents an opportunity to clarify it in the context of the European society, by comparison, at least, with the relevance that these manifestations have in the society in other countries. In this article, there are brought to discussions the various studies and research at European and Romanian level regarding the relevance of family and religion in a European and Romanian social context. Their study in the context of Romanian society is relevant also due to the particularity of Romanian society as a transition society from a totalitarian society, controlled by the state in the communist regime, in which they intervened massively in terms of the organization of the family and the expression of religious beliefs, to an open society of democratic type in which the individual is given the freedom of option in respect of the organization of his family and religious beliefs.*

Key words: *value; family; religion; totalitarian society; open society; Romanian society.*

Introduction

Family and religion are two universal social realities. For the time being, it cannot be envisaged a society in which these two deeply human manifestations do not exist, in one form or another (Otovescu, 2017: 112). Although they are perennial, they are not static, but they are in a specific dynamic with the spirit of the time, implicitly with the particularities that characterize a certain society. In this article, we intend to follow the characteristics of family and religion in the context of the present Romanian society. A changing society, at least regarding the radical change of political and ideological regime, a society in which, like all the states in the Eastern European bloc, for almost half a century, the communist experiment was conducted. Family and religion are also concrete forms of manifestation of social capital, relevant to the axiological dimension of a society. In the contemporary society, strongly secularized, the individual and the social groups need benchmarks, values in which to believe. Religion in its classical meaning tends to be replaced by civil religion (Cristi, 2001) and the belief of trust in social institutions and socially relevant values.

"In what believe those who do not believe?"

The analysis of the situation of social capital and confidence in the Romanian context must take into account the particularities of the Romanian society in relation to the experience of communism, definable as a closed society, with specific social control mechanisms, as well as the transition to the open society, the post-communist society in Eastern Europe. Romania, from this perspective, beyond the particular aspects, is part of this process of transition from the post-communist world. In democratic societies free consent and trust are natural elements: "trust is linked to a series of provisions that underlie democratic culture, including tolerance for pluralism and criticism" (Warren, 1999: 9).

Thus, in post-communist societies new types of cooperation had to be developed between individuals, on the one hand, and between individuals and the state, on the other hand. Specific to the communist regimes, based on the repression of free speech and action, was the indoctrination, coercion and, as a result, the establishment of control mechanisms based on mistrust and double standards between official statements and actual behavior. In communist societies it was clear that we should not believe in everything that is declared at the official and interpersonal level. One consequence of this was the emergence of a culture of relative trust. The low confidence scores of the population in certain institutions or in interpersonal relations are a consequence of the legacy of the communist period: "Theoretical analysis places Romania in a unique position, that of having no connection between social capital and the level of life satisfaction. This apparent exception could be attributed to the destruction of the communitarian sense in the communist period associated with the high degree of distrust between the neighbors of this period. On the other hand, since 1990, with the transitional period, due to geographical, community and neighborhood mobility it has not been possible to recover" (Halman, 2011: 96).

Postmodern society and fake news

Together with the above-mentioned factors, with historical and cutaneous determination, the confidence of Romanians, as of other people in the contemporary world, is determined by the characteristics of the type of post-modern society, influenced by the phenomenon of globalization, by multiculturalism and by the increasing impact of technology and media virtual communication. Romania, as a member of the EU, is fully connected to this type of reality and influence. Relevant for testing this new type of reality is the Eurobarometer from February 2018, so an EU-wide investigation that also includes Romania (Flash Eurobarometer 464). With direct reference to trust we have the first part of the report, namely Trust in news sources and awareness of fake news, which follows three aspects: 1. the level of trust in news sources; 2. Awareness of exposure to fake news (perceived exposure to Fake News); 3. Perceived ability to recognize Fake News).

According to the research, the Romanians trust the following sources of information, compared to those from other states, and the situation looks like this: a. Radio (55%); b. television (54%); c. written press -53%; d. online press - 42%, social media (online social networks and messaging apps) - 39%.

Interestingly, Romanians have the highest level of trust in social media in the EU - 39%, compared with, for example, 17% in Austria and Germany.

Regarding the confidence in the ability to discriminate against fake news, the Romanians have a high score - 79%, along with British, being outnumbered by Danes (87%), Irish (84%), Croats and Finns (82%). On the other hand, the perceived ability to recognize fake news is a problem for 58% of Romanian respondents, the same level as in Italy, Romania being in this regard in the first half of the ranking.

1. Family

1.1. The cross-cultural approach of the family as a value
The family, as a value in cross-cultural research (Voinea in Otovescu, coord., 2010), is a standard item, even strategic to the extent that, depending on it, relevant extensions and connections are possible. Thus, in a paper on the study of values (Inglehart, 1998: IX), the family, as a theme, has a dedicated part in a separate chapter, in which the following connections are highlighted:
- the importance of family, extended family, home satisfaction, marital status;
- sharing attitudes such as those regarding religion and morals, social life, political attitudes, attitudes towards sexuality, attitudes towards parents;
- marriage success (a. characteristics of marriage and partners: adequate income, common background, mutual respect, good administration of the household, sharing of religion, sharing of political beliefs, understanding and tolerance, children, common interests, marriage seen as a living institution respect for parents; b. characteristics related to children: ideal number of children, parents' debts, good manners, independence, hard work, responsibility, imagination, tolerance, respect, determination, religious belief, obedience, trust in the family).

1.2. Social sustainability of the family
Although there is a consensus among specialists regarding "the recognition of the family as a natural and fundamental unit of society, not the same is valid from the point of view of accepting a certain conception of the family" (Constantinescu, 2004: 10).

Over time, more and more sociologists have tried to highlight the characteristics of the family, those that distinguish it from any other group. Thus, Henri Walon (1971, p. 652) emphasizes that, "unlike other groups more or less optional, the family is a natural and necessary group. As a form of human communication, the family is perhaps the strongest of them, being characteristic for all stages of historical development and having a great stability as a social structure".

1.3. The family as an aspirational group

According to the French sociologist Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe (1971: 657) in the article "The evolution of needs and the dynamic conception of the family", the family group is considered as one of the intermediaries between the individual and the society, the family must be in a permanent relationship and communication with the other social groups, to represent, "an aspirational group and not a pressure group".

1.4. The family in cultural and identity context

Another direction of family research today, relevant to the context of postmodernity and of phenomena such as immigration, multiculturalism, the attempt to construct new, supranational identities (European citizenship, for example), tries to shine a light by comparison and contrast traditional conceptions about the family in a cultural context with the dynamics of current representations and practices related to the family (see Simpson, 2013). Thus, the work of the Patricia Ann Simpson updates the family problem, pointing out that in the context of immigration and multicuturalism, coordinates of the European family, characterized by the preference for the model of the small family, by the employment of both spouses, by the religious indifference against the background of the secularization of the European society, tend to change and accept other forms of representation and family formation, due to the cultural forms brought by non-European immigrants. In the case of immigrant families, in contrast to the standard family of the secularized European society, we have to deal with large families, with many children, whose life is determined by customs and religious values.

1.5. The value of the family in the Romanian context

The specificity of the research on the value of the family in the Romanian context is approachable on several levels, one of them may be that of highlighting the dynamics of the Romanian family, as representation and practice as follows: a. the traditional mentality about the family, still remaining in the village and certain geographical and cultural areas of Romania; b. the project and the representation of the family in the context of the communist era; c. representations about family, practices and family realities of Romanians during the transition period and as a result of contact with the phenomenon of multiculturalism following the migratory phenomenon of recent years.

Thus, in a study on family values in Romania (Voicu, 2007), the research is themed according to the following relevant coordinates: a. change and stability regarding the family; b. demographic changes and their impact on the Romanian family; c. family roles and status; d. the importance of marriage and the dynamics of family representations in Romania (the importance of marriage, consensual couples); e. satisfaction with family life; f. European orientations at the level of family.

However, the family aspects mentioned above can be found in applied studies of acute social phenomena in Romania during the transition period. One of these is without a doubt the migration phenomenon. Migration has multiple effects on Romanian children in the concrete reality in terms of demographic and symbolic representational aspects. A relatively recent study of this phenomenon is *The social worlds of the Romanian migration* (Sandu, 2010). Thus, referring to the situation of the migrants in Spain, Madrid, the author mentions: "in Madrid and, most likely, in Spain. One third of the Romanians from Madrid came alone to Spain, and two thirds with the family or part of the family. Migration of the latter is of a family type, within the family migration three subtypes are clearly distinguished: the migrant with the spouse (16% of the total immigrants), the migrant with the spouse plus other members of the family (27% of the total immigrants) and the migrant accompanied by family members different from husband or wife (26%)" (*ibidem*: 117).

The idea can be pursued in a possible detailed research, for example, on cultural spaces and countries of emigration of Romanians, in which, in addition to the demographic effect in Romania (Otovescu, Otovescu, 2019), the effects at the symbolic cultural level, the importation of certain models, respectively families from the cultures in which Romanians are found as migrants or, on the contrary, their resistance to them and the perpetuation of a traditional family model. In some cases, the values of the families of Romanians collided with the standard family model of the secularized European society. This is the case of the Bodnariu family in Norway, a family that emphasized Christian values in the education of children, which was considered excessive and inadequate for the contemporary family education model in that country (https: //ro.m.wikipedia .org / wiki / Cazul_Bodnariu).

Another study, relatively recent, regarding the changing Romanian family, which is worth mentioning, is *Family trajectories. Romania in European context* (Mureşan & Foldes, 2016). Thematically, the studies included in the paper are grouped into two parts: family solidarity and the changing family. The red thread of the first part's research is intergenerational solidarity. In this regard, the family from Romania of the recent period knows new phenomena, already existing at a more successful level in Western society, namely the phenomenon of loneliness, of insularization of generations within the same family, previously reunited in the extended family of traditional type. Thus, following a research on filial obligation in seven European countries, five countries in Central and Eastern Europe - Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia - and two countries in Western Europe - France and Norway, it has been found that in Romania religious traditions still have an influence on the filiation obligations: "In some societies, women can reject the rules related to filial responsibility to a greater extent than men. This phenomenon has been studied in the Netherlands by Van Bavel et al. (2010), and by Dykstra and Fokkema (2012), and in the case of France, Germany and Norway by Herlofson et al. (2011). Further research shows that the reverse is true for some Eastern European states (Romania, Bulgaria, Russia and Georgia), where women are more strongly linked to the idea of filial responsibility. This finding can

be considered an indicator of cultural change, given that the gender distribution of intergenerational solidarity is contested by women in Western Europe, while in the East, change is not so visible "(ibidem: 16).

Regarding the second part, the changing family, we mention the approach of consensual unions in Romania as an alternative to the traditional family model (ibidem, chap. 6-7). In this respect, the consensual union is a consequence of the transformation undergone by the Eastern European societies after 1990 at social, economic and cultural level. Characterized by the lower fertility and marriage rate: "Cohabitation as a form of partnership has begun to expand in Eastern Europe since the period of state socialism, but accelerated growth began after the regimes changed. Births within cohabitation have increased markedly over the last few decades throughout the European continent, contributing to non-marital births to a much greater extent than single mothers (without a co-resident partner)" (*ibidem*: 182).

This phenomenon is the consequence of several factors, on the one hand it is the phenomenon of emancipation of the woman, who tends to build her own career, who requires a period dedicated to studies and affirmation in professional and social life, and on the other hand, it is the consequence of the brutal changes at the economic level, which changed the situation of the relative safe income from the communist period with the one of the insecure incomes and jobs during the transition period, which calls into question the birth of one or more children under such conditions: "The analyses of Perelli-Harris and his co-workers (2010) on the relationship between education and non-marital births shows that women who benefit from more material resources and more economic opportunities (i.e. women with higher education) can choose a more stable lifestyle (in the form of marriage), while women with limited (poorly educated) resources persists in a lifestyle characterized by uncertainty, even when waiting for the birth of a child. Women with a low educational level and thus a less privileged job have lower prospects for career advancement, which is why having children is something that gives them meaning and structures their lives (Mills et al., 2003). When alternatives in the labour market are limited, when the perspectives for economic prosperity needed for marriage are lacking, women choose motherhood for self-fulfillment, because it is achievable regardless of financial stability or marital status" (*ibidem*: 188).

On the other hand, direct family opinion research is worth mentioning. Thus, to a question like: How much do you trust your family? 88% of the Romanians replied that they had very high confidence (IRES. 2010: 7). Interestingly, among those who gave such a response, most, according to the age category criterion, were those between 18-35 years (61%). According to the criterion of the school graduated, those with higher education were the most numerous respondents to this question (64.4%). According to the criterion of the region, the most numerous were those from the regions Romania South, Dobrogea and Bucharest (56.5%), followed by Transylvania and Banat (55.2), Moldova (45.7). This situation somehow reflects the

state of poverty spread over the geographical areas of Romania, Moldova being the first at this chapter.

We can also mention the way in which Romania appears in cross-cultural research at European level regarding the main aspects related to the family. Thus, regarding the preference for the traditional family, Romania is at the top of the ranking (Halman, Sieben & Van Zundert, 2011: 25), regarding the importance of learning good manners by children within the family, Romania is in the first place in this regard (ibidem, p. 27); Regarding the obedience of children towards their parents, Romania is also classified in the leading platoon (*ibidem*: 28). In terms of fidelity to the family and the freedom to have an extramarital affair, Romania is in the bottom half of the ranking, the lowest level of this type of freedom having Turkey, and the highest Belaurs, followed by France and the Czech Republic (*ibidem*: 23).

Psychosocial research conducted in our country (Chelcea, 1986; Mitrofan and Mitrofan, 1989; Voinea, 1996; Mihailescu, 1999 etc.) revealed that the family constitutes a higher value for the majority of the Romanian population, including for young people.

Thus, in Romania, "the propensity for marriage and family is still high, the cultural model valuing them high". (Constantinescu, 2004: 18). However, one should not lose sight of the alarm signal drawn by specialists in connection with the process of degradation of family life.

2. Religion

2.1. Theoretical perspectives on religion in sociological research

The fact that current European values, even if secularized, are still determined by the religious dimension is represented by their inclusion in cross cultural research as a reference indicator. Europe "is more than a mentis form, it is a form of faith, embodied in various religious and cultural expressions" (Remond, 2003: 25). The social, political and cultural history of Europe is accompanied by a history of religious and spiritual problems. Beyond the conflicts caused by the ambitions of some Christian institutions to get involved in the organization of the whole society, it cannot be disputed that a fundamental element of European unity and identity in relation to other civilizations is the Christian universe of values. Christianity has given a new face to the European space, through its symbols, through the places of worship, from the most modest churches to the most imposing cathedrals, through the erection of monasteries, through its liturgical calendar which has made its mark on time, through influence on the social and political institutions, through the particular cultural manifestation, through the promoted behavior, through the values of the person, having their roots in the idea of freedom and responsibility.

Before referring to religion as a value in the Romanian context, we briefly outline some contemporary views on the importance of the religious phenomenon from a social perspective.

2.2. Functions of religion

Niklas Luhmann (2013), referring to the main representatives of the sociology of religion, highlights the main "functions" of religion at the social level. Thus, religion is a form of content/meaning ("form of meaning", "Sinform"). For Durkheim, Luhmann points out, religion had a moral meaning in society; for Max Weber, and religion has the function at the social level to rationalize the common events. The relationship thus represents at the social level for sociologists a framework of aggregation and communication of groups, it is in a code.

Referring to the secularization process, through which the influence of religion is reduced on different spheres of social life, Anthony Giddens (2000) states that there are three aspects or dimensions of it. The first refers to the number of members of religious organizations, namely how many people belong to a certain church or religious institution and participate in services or other ceremonies. In this respect, in the industrialized countries (with the exception of the United States) there was a significant secularization. The second dimension of secularization concerns the degree to which churches and other religious organizations retain their social influence, wealth and prestige. In the past, religious organizations had an important influence on governments and society. This influence has gradually diminished almost worldwide. In terms of wealth, the situation differs from one religious organization to another: some recognized churches are quite rich (material heritage, objects of worship, financial capacity to get involved in social, educational, mission work), new religious movements can be enriched quite quickly, and others have an insecure financial situation.

The third dimension, religiosity, refers to beliefs and values. In this sense, we can speak of a detachment of ethics (of the principles and rules of behavior), of religion, even if we generally understand it as supernatural. Many people reject religion as the foundation of morality, replacing it with values such as natural liberty, human dignity or simply complying with the laws of the country or community concerned for fear of the negative consequences that would result from their violation. On a personal level, secularization often leads to young people growing up in a social and family environment where the transcendent dimension is neglected, at the loss of the meaning of life, of the chance of a true salvation. In turn, they often lead to depression, self-destructive or antisocial manifestations.

Wilson (2000) identifies several functions of religion at the social level. One of the functions of religion refers to the fact that "myths and rituals allowed individuals to have collective feelings and to express a feeling of social unity" (Wilson, 2000: 44). In other words, religion maintains social cohesion, renews and deepens the perception about the community's own existence, as well as its legitimacy. The contemporary society, which, unlike the community, is characterized by impersonal,

rationalized relations, is increasingly pluralistic, both in cultural manifestations and in religion. The number of different denominations or sects has increased especially because of the waves of migration, which amplifies the ethnic and religious diversity within the nation-states. But even in areas where the phenomenon of migration did not occur, the process of religious diffusion appeared. For example, in many Asian countries there are Christian or Muslim religious minorities, which distinguish many different groups. The attitudes of these movements towards each other range from mutual ignorance to mistrust, rivalry or hostility, even if the ultimate values they adhere to are expressed in a similar way. It is precisely this diversity that alters, in present-day societies, the function of religion to enhance social cohesion.

A second function of religion is to provide a moral foundation, of supernatural origin, for social control. The existence of moral norms brings with it the behavioural sanctions: good deeds are rewarded, and bad ones are punished, divine justice is fully realized in the next life, but in the present, people bear the consequences of their deeds. Currently, in Western secular societies, behavioural control is no longer dependent on religious sanctions. The effect of secularization is all the more visible if we take into account the fact that European countries are the heirs of a Judeo-Christian tradition, and in this case the moral order of the societies was to the greatest extent supported by religious prohibitions and restrictions. Currently, it seems that the promise of eternal life, on the one hand, and the threat of eternal punishment, on the other hand, no longer represent strong psychic incentives for proper social behaviour. In the past, it was considered (under the influence of the ideas of Christianity) that people cannot achieve a perfect justice on earth, given their failure, neither in terms of laws (their quality and quantity) nor under their application. Therefore, the Church exhorted the rich and powerful to show compassion and generosity to the poor, an attitude worthy of the Lord's reward, as is evident from the Gospels. Also, to the poor, the Church urged them to be content with what they had, to have an attitude of obedience and respect for their social superiors and to believe that they would be rewarded for them in later life. In the contemporary world, the law covers many aspects regarding the disruption of social relations, but strictly personal moral issues (such as those related to sexuality) tend to fall outside the scope of the law. Hence the reduced place - compared to what was in the past - of religion in strengthening social control. At the same time, many technical issues have become the subject of legal control: those concerning contracts, possessions, economic exchanges, the status of associations, organizations, scientific discoveries, etc. This change leads to a new mentality about the process of socializing children: parents make much less appeal to religion when they try to induce their children moral attitudes. The current moral education is based on more and more pragmatic reasons, a calculation on the things that should be achieved or avoided. From this calculation "progressively disappear that diffused kindness towards people and that disinterested commitment that the old religion-inspired codes preached" (*ibidem*: 50).

Another function of religions is to provide an explanation of the physical universe, (though not all include a myth of creation), or allow people to ignore it, as in the case of Theravada Buddhism. Currently, no advanced society accepts the interpretations of religion regarding the physical universe, a role that has been taken over by science. The myths of creation are accepted only as allegories with symbolic meaning, recognizing them only as an aesthetic role.

Further, he shows that, as a fourth function, religion had the role of legitimizing the goals and procedures of society: it sealed the commitments made, it justified the wars, it explained the misfortunes, it represented the Supreme Court in disputes, it sanctioned certain relations and modes of action, it prescribed techniques with the role to support and arm people in the struggle with life's difficulties. Nowadays, wars, political parties, public disputes and business seek their legitimacy in sources other than religion. The major corporations are organized on an impersonal structure, and among the issues discussed are not the religious implications of their economic activity. For example, when considering the working conditions of the employees or the effects on the environment, the character of the discussion is not religious: they are not talking about the sin of destroying nature, but in terms of illegality or, in the happiest case, immorality of the pollution act. .

The fifth function of religion refers to its ability "to confer an identity on individuals and groups of individuals or to strengthen the sense of identity born of other types of human associations and affiliations" (pp. 45-46 In other words, in the case of individuals, religion answered the question "Who am I?", And in the case of groups – "Who are we?". The type of response offered by them has no meaning limited to a certain field of knowledge (psychological, sociological, biological, etc.), but reaches the highest level of generality, by defining the place of the individual or group in the cosmic order and in the perspective of eternity. Therefore, these answers of an absolute nature imply in the case of the advanced religions the acceptance of a metaphysical scheme of the world, each thing receiving its value within it. Although at present individuals and groups may seek support and confirmation in religion for their ideas about themselves, "modern nation-states are not based on religious legitimacy, possibly included in their constitutions" (p. 51). On the contrary, most societies in modern states share secular conceptions or are even based on explicitly atheistic philosophies, as is the case with communist states. Sociologists argue that in modernized pluralist societies conflicts do not occur precisely because the source of value consensus is no longer religion. In contrast, social and political tensions appear in societies that have stepped rapidly, from a great leap (not as in the West, in stages) into the era of contemporary technology. The explanation of the emergence of these tensions is represented by the sudden encounter between divergent orientations towards the world (traditional religious values face to face with pragmatic and instrumental inclinations), sometimes reaching anti-modern revolutionary movements.

Finally, a sixth function of religion is to be a factor for expressing and regulating emotions. The religious ritual facilitates the expression of emotions, and then manages them, offering the opportunity and the way to manifest them in a decent and controlled form. The source of human emotional needs is often the confrontation with the obstacles of life. Through the symbolic action of the rituals, religion spiritually exalts these emotions and gives them a solemn character. Today, significant competitive factors have emerged regarding the expression and regulation of emotions. Factors such as television, movies and pop music have a great ability to manipulate emotional life, especially since they have much more technically advanced channels of communication than those of religious groups. In addition, the attraction exerted by these factors is amplified by the fact that it offers contexts in which the emotional experience is completely separated by moral discourse, civic or social commitment. In the emotional contexts offered by elements such as those mentioned above, emotions can only be lived in a hedonistic way, only for the sake of personal pleasure; instead, within the religious framework, even if such satisfaction could be obtained, she always received the image of sober obligations. Modern factors rarely get used to emotions for moral reasons; rather, morality becomes an element of propaganda, being relativized by politicization. The current technological means ensure efficiency in this regard. Individuals no longer meet - as in the case of religious rituals - with those elements that integrated them into the community and at the same time established certain moral benchmarks. Having the role of liberation and emotional regulation in a social context, the emotional manifestations caused by rituals did not only concern the individual and they did not just focus on him. At present, the individual is alone in these manifestations and it is considered that - in the absence of a massive and express cultural consensus - it is up to him how he will achieve the socially acceptable balance. "The increasing spread of gambling, the manipulation of people's desire to win effortlessly, the supply, as well as the demand for pornography, growing larger and more undisguised, are indications of an efficient exploitation of people's emotions" (*ibidem*: 53). If the religious rituals are carried out according to a certain logic dictated by the religious calendar or they respond to the acute emotional needs of the people (in the traumatic situations of life), the new competition factors upset the emotionally dependent people. Because access to them is continuous, regardless of emotional needs and a certain rhythm, the emotional experience is trivialized. In other words, on the one hand, false needs are created, and on the other, true emotional needs are not adequately answered. The emotional organs of man are disturbed by the wide emotional manipulation and the effective control practiced on large sectors of the contemporary society. In this context, it can even happen that the process is irreversible, ie the old emotional dispositions induced by religion (when the emotion was put at the service of morality), it is impossible to revive. Having said that, can it still be said that emotion regulation continues to be a latent socially relevant latent function of religion?

The contemporary man is not more intelligent or rational than his ancestors, but he lives in a world that is subjected to an increasing degree of rational control. Being rational means having the right reactions to modern stimuli, and those reactions come to represent a certain mode of behavior, which replaces the one determined by reflexivity, value reason. There is pressure from the contemporary social system, in the sense of developing new techniques and of moving away from the type of moral education cultivated in the past. Accepting technological control, the individual learns to use rigorous cause-effect thinking, defending the risk of applying it more and more to his personal life, or in areas "where there are no direct pressures that require this kind of thinking" (*ibidem*).

The multiplication of international organizations and problems, the globalization of markets and capital, consumerism make the old religious forms do not find their place, and the strictly local traditions represent something foreign to modernity. Religious concerns are currently of low prestige because of their relativization, which can be attributed to the awareness of the great diversity of existing religious movements.

2.3. Religion as a value in the Romanian context

Religion, according to cross-cultural studies, is a very important value for Romanians. However, many issues remain to be clarified about this finding. Aspects related to the dynamics of this fact in historical and social context as well as about the particularities of the type of religiosity of the Romanians.

In terms of the dynamics of the status of religion as a social fact, on the historical line, we must refer to three reference moments in the logic of recent Romanian history: religion in Romanian society before the establishment of communism, during the communist regime and after 1989. It concerns both the official status of the religion, from the perspective of freedom of conscience and its restriction, as well as the type of development of the Romanian society in these three historical moments. In terms of cultural becoming, the three moments can be characterized as modelled societies, even if not completely determined, by the following types of generic mentalities: traditional mentalism, modern communist type mentality, postmodern mentality. Starting from here, we can more precisely circumscribe the type of religiosity of the Romanians and its axiological classification in a certain type of ethos, of effective value horizon.

In terms of terminology, we think it is good to make a distinction between religious politics in these historical moments and the religiosity not so much of Romanian as a generic term but of Romanians, or citizens living in Romania. Both in the aftermath of the establishment of communism and in the communist period, there was not so much talk about the values of the Romanians, but about the values of the Romanian. This is explained both by the methodology and theories about society specific to the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, when the idea of a psychology of the peoples was still accepted, as well as because

of the uniformist communist ideology, enhanced by the Romanian national-communism.

Paradoxically, both the inter-war period and the communist period had limiting characteristics in relation to the freedom of conscience of the citizens of Romania. During the interwar period, against the backdrop of the fascist ideology of the legionary type and of the exaltation of nationalism combined with orthodoxy, I had to deal with restricting the freedom of religious expression of Romanian citizens by confessions other than the Orthodox one. The inter-war period, from the perspective of the Romanians' religiosity, is an effervescent period on the social level, in which an attempt is being made for a kind of orthodox revival both at the level of the political ideologies of the time, and in particular the ideology of the Iron Guard, but also at the popular level, the case of Petrache Poenaru from Maglavit, or the emergence of the religious movement Oastea Domnului (Army of God) within the Romanian Orthodox Church. It is the period in which, following the defrocking of some Orthodox people with influence among the parishioners (it is the priest Tudor Popescu from Cuibul de Barza), here appears the first non-Protestant Romanian confession, later known as the Romanian Evangelical Church, spread especially in Muntenia, Muscel and Dâmboviţa area. The diversity of religious types and religious experience will be heavily revealed and brought to light in the communist prisons, ironically becoming a place of dialogue and atonement for the representatives of all forms of religiousness in Romania (a good source of documentation in this regard is the memorialistic literature, see Nicolae Steinhard, Richard Wurmbrand, Ioan Ianelide, Sergiu Grossu).

During the communist period, the religious policy of the state was assumed to be one of restriction of freedom of conscience for all religious manifestations and cults. However, religiosity first as a fundamental human phenomenon and then as a psycho-social phenomenon could not be fully controlled. In communist Romania, the manifestation of religiosity and freedom of conscience during the communist period was of a particular character, perhaps more drastic than in other parts of the communist bloc (central European countries, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia), but more permissive than in countries such as Albania or the USSR. In Romania, the communists, perhaps unconsciously, have finally accepted tacitly the religion as a sociological reality, a social form, which could be used to some extent in the policy of social control. Thus, in Romania, which was to be made clearer after 1989, the population was inclined to one form of religiosity or another to a much greater degree than in other European countries, be they from the former socialist camp or from the Western area. We have to deal with a phenomenon that remains to be explained, at least from the perspective of the secularization tendency in the European cultural space.

After 1989, the dynamics of religious manifestations in Romania acquire different trajectories and intensities compared to the communist period. On the one hand, through the "liberalization" of the religious domain, on the other hand, through Romania's exit from previous isolation and its integration into the broad

process of globalization with all its faces, multiculturalism, the growing influence of the technology of communication in people's life, the reality of the migratory phenomenon of the population of Romania and access to other cultural, religious pictures, etc.

Regarding the relevance of religion as a value for Romanians, we currently have the results of cross-cultural research EVS and WVS, as well as a series of studies on religion as value.

Thus, more research shows that Romania appears as one of the most religious countries (Gheorghiu, 2003; Halman, Draulans, 2004; Muller, 2004; Pollack, 2001, 2003, 2004, apud Voicu, 2007: 151). We are dealing with a process of revitalizing religiosity in the transition period. There are several hypotheses regarding the explanation of this phenomenon, hypotheses related to the degree of education of a society, and its determination to the general phenomenon of modernizing the society, economic development and well-being. In the context of the former communist states and the period of their transition to the capitalist economy and private property, a series of painful transformations took place at the social level, which created a mood of insecurity, a decrease in income and the standard of living, an indeterminacy with regard to the near future: "All these create a high degree of existential insecurity and may be the basis of the religious revitalization that was signaled in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of communism" (Voicu, 2007). The existential insecurity of the individual in such a context represents a premise for its orientation to the domain of religion, which offers an explanatory framework, an existential meaning and support. Another explanation would be that with the collapse of the "Marxist orientation regimes it gave the possibility of manifesting religiosity publicly and paved the way for religious education and propaganda. The emergence of discussions on religious issues in the media, as well as the establishment of religious education, allowed the penetration of the knowledge related to religion at the population level and created the premises for a religious revitalization. Beyond the effects of the economic downturn or the liberalization of the market for religious goods, lifting the restrictions imposed on religious practice and faith may have contributed to the start of religious revitalization" (*Ibidem*: 156). The indicators for increasing religiousness in Romania are on the one hand the attendance of the church, and on the other hand the confidence of the population in the church. In the first case, the share of those who attend the church at least once a month from 31% in 1993 to 46% in 2005. Also, according to the sociological studies after 1990, the confidence of the population in the church has increased greatly, 88% in 2005 (Voicu, 2007).

This increase in church confidence and religiosity in Romania must also be linked to the change of religious policy after 1989, to measures such as the constitutional and factual guarantee of the freedom of conscience and the introduction as a school discipline of a new subject, Religion, from the first grade. Beyond these statistics, one must go deeper and investigate the degree of superficiality and intensity of religiosity, on the one hand, and the variety of types of

religiosity. At the level of the Romanian society, we have to do not rarely with a cognitive dissonance of the type "to do what the priest says, not what the priest does". Also, when we talk about trust in an institution, we should see how it is outlined through clear coordinates in the collective mind, what expectations project the questioned subjects on it.

The approach of a research of religion as a value for Romanians is still topical from at least a few points of view: the emergence of new forms of religiosity in the context of globalization, the relation of this value with other values of Romanians (for example, family as value and the recent referendum between family), religion as a symbol and institutionalization in Romania (for example, the construction and recent inauguration of the Cathedral of the Nation)

Conclusion

As for the religion, according to the polls, Romanians are faithful people and have very high confidence in the church as an institution. In this case, however, the values following the assumption of religious behaviour must be investigated. Values such as godliness, honesty, self-help, and respect for the religious calendar, diligence, submission to authority, respect for marital life and fidelity to the life partner can be mentioned here. One can research quite interestingly the repair and prevalence of these subsequent values of religion according to religious cults and minorities.

The family, in turn, as a value, implies a series of attitudes that particularize the Romanians in relation to the populations from other countries. It is about the continuity of some aspects of the family that it establishes traditionally, for example the fact that Romanians still prefer the family constituted by marriage more than the family constituted on the basis of a civil partnership. One can also mention the existence of the extended family. On the other hand, there is an increasing influence of the modern social-economic way of life, claiming the right to family recognition, for example, among LGBT sexual minority partners. Other aspects of the family dynamics that value in today's society are the multiplication of the number of single-parent families, the abandonment or neglect of children due to the precarious economic situation and the migration of parents looking for a job abroad. The refusal, the lack of desire to proceed, the option for abortion is another valuable reality regarding the family in the current Romanian society.

Last but not least, an extremely interesting aspect can be represented by the relationship between the subsequent values of religion and those of the family. It can be discussed about the cultural modelling or remodelling of the family depending on the religious values, or on the contrary, by renouncing them on the basis of secularization.

In terms of both religion and family, in 2018, two major events took place regarding the value options and the attitudes of the population towards them. It is about the consecration of the Cathedral of the Salvation of the Nation and the referendum for the traditional family.

In the first case, the symbolic dimension of values can be exploited, the need to raise some grand buildings for the strengthening of identity values such as national belonging, Christianity as value and assumed cultural model.

Extremely interesting, at least through the intensity of the debates started in the Romanian society, was the referendum for the traditional family. The event brought into question the availability for tolerance and innovation regarding the family, but at the same time it highlighted the value of the family as the form of respecting the biological, procreative, educational, gender identity dimensions.

The research presented in this report remains to be deepened in the following stages in terms of data, the connection between them and the value options at the level of social groups or from the perspective of certain social fields. Also, during the next stages of the research we will focus on clarifying more deeply the theoretical and methodological dimension.

References:

1. Arts, W.; Halman, L. (2004). *European Values at the Turn of the Millennium*, Boston: Brill Leiden.
2. Chombart, de Lauwe; Paul-Henry. (1971). *Evoluția trebuințelor şi concepţia dinamică a familiei* in Aluaş, I.; Drăgan, I. (1971). *Sociologie franceză conteporană*. Bucharest: Politica.
3. Coleman, J. S. (1994). *Foundations of social theory*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
4. Comşa, M. (2006). *Stiluri de viaţă în Romania după 1989*. Cluj Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană.
5. Constantinescu, M. (2004a). *Sociologia familiei. Probleme teoretice si aplicatii practice*. Pitesti: Universitatii din Pitesti.
6. Constantinescu, M. (2004b). *Competenţa socială si competenţa profesională*. Bucharest: Economica.
7. Constantinescu, M. (2008). *Familia romaneasca intre traditie si modernitate*. Pitesti: Universitatii din Pitesti.
8. Cristi, M. (2011). *From Civil to Political Religion: the Intersection of culture, religion and Politics*. Wilfrid Laurier Univesitiy Press.
9. David, D., (2015). *Psihologia poporului român: Profilul psihologic al românilor într-o monografie cognitiv-experimentală*. Iasi: Polirom.
10. Genosko, G. (1999). *Mcluhan and Baudrillard: The Masters of Implosion*. London: Routledge.
11. Giddens, Anthony. (2000). *Sociologie*, Bucharest: All.

12. Gorun A.; Gorun. H. T. (2012). *O istorie recentă a capitalului social. Marea ruptura si noua matrice existențială*, Bucharest: Didactică și Pedagogică.

13. Halman, L.; Sieben, I.; Van Zundert, M. (2011). *Atlas of European Values, Trends and Traditions at the turn of the Century*. London: Brill.

14. Inglehart, R. (1998). *Human values and beliefs: a cross-cultural sourcebook: political, religious, sexual, and economic norms in 43 societies*. Michigan: University of Michigan.

15. Luhmann, N. (2013). *A Systems Theory of Religion*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

16. Martini, C. M; Eco, U. (2011). *În ce cred cei care nu cred?*, Iasi: Polirom.

17. Maslow , A. H. (2007). *Motivaţie şi personalitate*. Bucharest: Trei.

18. Matei, A.; Rădulescu, C. (2011). *National and european values of public administration in the Balkans.* Bucharest: Economică.

19. McLuhan, M. (1975)*. Galaxia Gutenberg*. Bucharest: Politică.

20. Mureşan, C.; Foleds, I. (2016). *Traiectorii familiale. România în context. European*. Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară clujeană.

21. Otovescu, C.; Otovescu, A. (2019). *The Depopulation of Romania – Is It an Irreversible Process?* in *Revista de Cercetare si Interventie Sociala*, 65: 370-388.

22. Otovescu, D. (2017). *Sociologia culturii româneşti. Structuri teoretice şi realizări publicistice.* Ediţia a II-a, revizuită şi adăugită. Craiova: Scrisul Românesc.

23. Otovescu, D. coord. (2010). *Tratat de sociologie generala.* Craiova: Beladi.

24. Popescu, R. (2009). *Introducere în sociologia familiei: familia românească în societatea contemporană.* Iaşi: Polirom.

25. Radulescu-Motru, C. (1999). *Psihologia poporului român*, Bucharest: Paideia.

26. Remond, R. (2003). *Religie şi societate în Europa*. Iaşi: Polirom.

27. Sandu, D. (1996). *Sociologia tranzitiei. Valori si tipuri sociale în România*. Bucharest: Staff.

28. Sandu, D. coord. (2006). *Viaţa socială în România urbană*. Iaşi: Polirom.

29. Sandu, D. (2010). *Lumile sociale ale migraţiei romaneşti în străinătate*. Iaşi: Polirom.

30. Segalen, M. (2011). *Sociologia familiei.* Iaşi: Polirom.

31. Simpson, P. A. (2013). *Reimagining the European Family Cultures of Immigration*. London: Palgrave Macmilan.

32. Vasile, M. (2010). *Stiluri de viaţă în România postcomunistă*. *Ce modele comportamentale adoptăm şi de ce*. Iaşi: Lumen.

33. Voicu, B.; Voicu, M. (coord.). (2007). *Valori ale românilor: 1993-2006. O perspectivă sociologică*. Iaşi: Institutul European.

34. Voicu, M. (2007), *România Religioasă*. Iaşi: Institutul European.

35. Voinea, M. (2010). *Sociologia familiei* in Otovescu, Dumitru. (coord.). (2010). *Tratat de sociologie generală*. Craiova: Beladi.

36. Walon, H. (1971). *Familia si copilul* in Aluas, I.; Dragan, I. (1971). *Sociologie franceză contemporană*. Bucharest: Politica.
37. Zamfir, C.; Stanescu, S. coord. (2007). *Enciclopedia Dezvoltării Sociale.* Iași: Polirom.
38. IRES (2010) Barometrul increderii românilor [on-line] available at: www.ires.com.ro/articol/68/barometrul-increderii-romanilor
*** https://ro.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cazul_Bodnariu