

ARMED CONFLICTS AND IMPACTS ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (2003-2014)

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Abstract: *A very poor, landlocked country, the Central African Republic has experienced unprecedented politico-military crises since the last coup attempt of October 25, 2002, which led to the political change of March 15, 2003. For years now, the RCA has experienced repeated mutinies and recurring coup attempts, which have only tragically worsened the conditions for survival of most of its population. The consequences were not limited to the capital as in the past; they affected the hinterland, with the withdrawal of the former rebellion which occupied part of the national territory. The country was divided into different zones: an area under government control, an area under the direct control of the insurgents and a third area cut off from the main roads, and therefore isolated from communications with the capital. Such a partition has led to a serious deterioration in the lives of at least 2.2 million people directly or indirectly affected by the consequences of the conflict. Our article proposes to question the socio-political trajectory of the CAR, analyzes the viability of the various military operations and their impact on development.*

Keywords: Armed Groups, Conflicts, Incidence, Development, Central African Republic

A Central African country, the Central African Republic has been mobilizing more or more vehement analysts for several years. Facts, more or less explosive, some of which date from the period of transfer of sovereignty, maintain misunderstandings and tensions. The State, meanwhile, badly articulated before and after the democratic opening of 1990, struggled to deploy properly (Antier, 2008:8). In December 2012, the regime of François Bozizé, had been built on a frothy state base since March 15, 2003, the political and military situation changed with the overthrow of the old regime and the establishment of a government of transition extended to the opposition and all the political forces of the country, including the party of the former President. The new authorities suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and the government and took new measures aimed at restoring security through operations of disarmament and recovery of looted objects, peace and unity, creation of a national transition council and a government responsible for boosting growth and preparing for the next elections (Tamekamta, 2013:2). They have created favorable conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance to affected populations. Indeed, the populations living in the former conflict zones are experiencing a very worrying humanitarian situation. The lack of access to supplies from the capital has deprived the local populations of basic necessities as well as the possibility of benefiting from basic health services, systematically looted by each other; the occupation of areas by General Bozizé forces or their liberation by loyalist forces and the presence of the active front near towns and villages have exposed the populations to repeated abuses forcing many people to live in permanent insecurity, often forced to abandon daily occupations and seek refuge in the bush. So what explains the repeated violence in the Central African Republic? Through written documents and oral sources we will question are the different actors in conflict? And what is the impact of these conflicts on the development of CAR? The answer to these questions will constitute the framework of our present analysis.

1. Conflicts in the Central African Republic: roots, actors and geopolitical issues

The Central African Republic has for several years displayed the face of a country that is politically unstable, economically weak, socially disintegrated and in which the level of insecurity is very high. From 1996, the mutinies and Coups d'Etat which followed one another negatively affected society and disrupted the business cycle.

1.1. Roots and Actors of Current Violence

The Central African Republic, a former French colony called Oubangui-Chari which became independent on August 13, 1960, has a particular history marked by a succession of coups. With an area of 622,984 km² and 4.6 million inhabitants in 2012, the CAR is the result of the fight against the French settlers, led by the priest Barthelemy Boganda, who died in a plane crash on March 29, 1959. Subsequently, David Dacko, cousin of the latter, succeeded him until the "New Year's Eve putsch" by which another distant cousin, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, took power. After being enthroned emperor on December 4, 1974, he was ousted in 1979 by "Operation Barracuda". His imperial coronation, initially acquiesced by France, structured around Napoleonic mimicry in the court of Barengo, was accompanied by the total drying up of the state coffers and the defilement/distortion of the Central African in his self-esteem. Returned to power in 1979 by the care of France, David Dacko strongly marked by a permanent illegitimacy and accused of usurpation by his enemies and probably approved the putsch by mutual consent of September 1, 1981 through which General André Kolingba took the reins of power. Strongly influenced and supported by France until 1990, André Kolingba was gradually let go by François Mitterrand who probably reproached him for his managerial zeal and the non-application of the Baule clauses (Ango Ela, 2001: 35).

At the same time, social unrest in the form of mutinies arose in the country and forced the general-president to organize the first ballot and to withdraw from political life. Ange-Félix Patassé, who succeeded him on October 22, 1993, failed to reconcile the Central Africans. The delays in payment of civil servants' salaries, the suspicions of financial mismanagement, the confiscation of the electoral process and the unjustified death of numerous personalities (including the former dictator Jean-Bedel Bokassa) for which he is accused, engage the country in a series of mutinies, violence and instability (Ango Ela, 2001: 47). Despite the signing, in January 1997, of the Bangui agreements supposed to put an end to the conflicts, the re-election of Patassé on September 19, 1999, once again set the country up for violence. Also, the efforts of the international community and the military support given to Patassé by the Congolese rebel Jean-Pierre Bemba, did not dissuade General François Bozizé, leader of the rebellion of the liberators and former chief of staff of Patassé, to seize power following the coup d'état of March 15, 2003. Welcomed by an innocent jubilant crowd, Bozizé, supported by the political convergence baptized: Kwa Na Kwa, did not succeed in cleaning up life public. Instead, a disjointed and phantom state in its functioning was constituted, characterized by social resentment, institutional tinkering and democratic archaism (Kalck, 1992: 26).

1.2. The actors of the conflicts in the Central African Republic

As for the rebel coalition, otherwise known as Séléka, made up of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the UFDR, the FDPC and numerous rebel groups, and probably supported by Chad, it was born in December 2012. Initially based in the north of the country, this rebellion of 4,000 turbaned men - the majority of whom are Muslims - launched an offensive after which the main towns (Bambari, Kaga Bandoro and Ndélé) were occupied in two weeks. Very cornered, François Bozizé, from whom the N'Djamena security proxy was withdrawn, summoned the intervention of the Multinational Force for Central Africa (FOMAC) and requested the mediation of ECCAS (Benghemane, 1983: 17). Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, a mediator mandated by ECCAS, manages to obtain an agreement in Libreville on January 11, 2013. This was initiated by the presidential representatives (led by Jean Willy Biro Sako), the non-military politico-military movements combatants (MLC and FDPC

represented by Abdoulaye Hissene), the democratic opposition (represented by Nicolas Tiangaye) and the Séléka coalition (composed of the CPJP, the UFDR, the UFR, reinforced by the Patriotic Convention for the Salvation of Wa Kodro, CPSK, represented by Michel Am Nondroko Djotodjia). It revolved around the following clauses: the retention of the President of the Republic until the end of his mandate (2016), the formation of the government of national unity, the release (Berman, 2008: 10).

1.3. The Libreville Agreement and its impact

Although appreciated on the whole, the Libreville Agreement has, however, aroused dissension and suspicion on both sides. The Séléka coalition, suspected of violating the ceasefire, accused the Bozizé camp of having torpedoed the terms of the Libreville agreement, despite the formation of the government of national unity on February 3, 2013 (Berman, 2008: 11). The overlay political intrigues and the difficulty of mobilizing and disarming destitute child soldiers recruited by the Séléka, the situation deteriorated until Bozizé lost the total confidence and legitimacy granted to him by Idriss Deby Itno, Jacob Zuma and Francois Hollande (Biyogue-Bi-Ntougou, 2010: 15). Indeed, mocked by his friends of yesterday and subscribed to his fate, Bozizé only counted on the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), under-trained, under-equipped and demotivated, incapable at the strategic and operational level of winning a military victory. These forces remained loyal as well as the South African Defense Force (SADF) could not cope with the firepower of the Seleka, who had previously taken hostage their leader, Michel Djotodjia, who had left for their eastern stronghold of the country, for circumstantial mediation with the central power (Berman, 2008: 13). Lonely and deaf to the multiple arrests of the Congolese mediator, Bozizé was driven from power on March 24, 2013 by the rebellion which he said was in the pay of Chad and Sudan. In his inglorious flight, the deposed president took refuge in Yaoundé where the government authorities told him that he was in transit to an unknown exile. During his transitional stay in Cameroon, Bozizé multiplies meetings with the national and international press and says he is the victim of a plot by promising the worst to the new authorities (Benghemane, 1983: 22).

Since then, in defiance of human dignity, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated, punctuated by the events that occurred on the night of August 6 to 7, 2013 in the locality of Bossangoa (capital of the prefecture of Ouham in North-east of Bangui), with more than a hundred dead and the beginnings of the genocide. Now, the Muslim population, suspected close to the Seleka, is the target of attacks by loyal to the ousted president. On the other hand, the Christian population, accused of being in collusion with the ex-FACA and François Bozizé, is the victim of the abuses of the Séléka. This is how the self-defense groups, called anti-balakas formed by the Christian populations in September in reaction to the exactions of the elements of the Séléka essentially target Muslims; hence the deadly clashes in Bossangoa (September 2013), Bouar (October 2013) and Bangui (since December 5, 2013 despite the French and African military presence) that left several hundred dead.

Today, the RCA threatens to die, as the settling of accounts and the cruelest abuses overlap (Kalck, 1992: 33). Several actors are involved in the ongoing conflict: the internal actors, the main animators of the Central African “drama” and the external actors, forgers of the expected peace. As for the internal actors, they were initially made up of the FACA and the Séléka rebels (20,000 combatants from the CAR and especially from Sudan and Chad in September 2013) to which were added the lively political opposition by Prime Minister Michel Tiangaye. Today, the fighting forces have been reconstituted around the ex-Séléka divided into several rival factions; anti-balakas and Godobé. External actors consist of neighboring countries supplying mercenaries (Chad and Sudan), providers of transnational disorder, African countries concerned with peace (Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, etc.), regional institutions and sub-regional (AU, ECCAS, CEMAC) and bilateral and multilateral partners (France, EU, and UN) (Biyogue-Bi-Ntougou, 2010: 26).

2. The regionalization of the conflict: multiple issues

Five elements can explain the regional dimension of the Central African conflict: the regional approach to solutions to end the crisis, the belligerent influence of certain neighboring States in the persistence of the conflict, the movement of refugees, the sub-regional transfer of insecurity and the symbolic quest for leadership by certain heads of state. Regarding the first element, it concerns the sub-regional political effort (Biyogue-Bi-Ntougou, 2010: 33).

2.1. Crisis exit initiatives

These are initiatives and acts to end the crisis, concluded within the framework of the African Union, ECCAS and CEMAC (Tamekamta, 2013:5). Thus, the multiple agreements, concluded after tough negotiations, poorly executed by the Bangui authorities, have accelerated the spread of the political field by armed groups and political artificers, more businessmen and gang leaders than patriots. It is in this context that, on June 21, 2008, a so-called General Peace Agreement (APG) was signed in Libreville by the Central African government and three rebel movements, under the mediation of Omar Bongo Ondimba and Muammar Gaddafi. This one, summarizing the previous agreements, is accompanied by multiple clauses. Moreover, the rebel groups (mostly from the "Liberators" of 2003), the political opposition and civil society said they had been cheated by François Bozizé who only applied the terms of the agreement which were favorable to him (Biyogue-Bi-Ntougou, 2010: 45).

2.2. The involvement of some neighboring states

This element concerns the involvement of certain neighboring States in the maintenance of the Central African conflict. In this register, Chad plays a leading role. François Bozizé took power in 2003 thanks to the support of N'Djamena. Also, the Séléka benefited from the military support of Chad in March 2013. The second role is played by plural rebel groups that scour the territorial peripheries of Sudan and the DRC. Massively recruited for a decade, these, more seasoned, make up the main fighting factions and make the most of the illicit exploitation of the country's wealth.

2.3. Conflicts in the Central African Republic and refugee movements

The Central African conflicts have set in motion several thousand inhabitants (5,000 Central African refugees in Congo-Brazzaville in June 2013, more than 80,000 in eastern Cameroon). The fourth element is determined by the insecurity broadcast from the CAR. The neighboring countries, in particular Cameroon, are more marked than the others. Indeed, the eastern region of Cameroon has suffered, for several months, repeated attacks by armed men from the CAR. Elements of the Séléka are indignant at the fact that Cameroon has granted temporary asylum to the deposed president and that it is sheltering the ex-FACA who plan to reconquer Bangui (Tamekamta, 2013:7). The frequent altercations between the security elements on the border of Cameroon with the elements of the Séléka resulted in the death, on August 19, 2013 in Tocktoyo, of the Cameroonian officer of 2nd rank and chief of post of the border locality, Félix Ngando Dalle. Also, on November 16, 2013 in Gbiti, new incursions by Central African armed groups left one dead and several injured on the side of the Cameroonian army. This painful sequence turns out to be the climax of the difficult relations between the two countries and could justify, in part, the procrastination of Cameroon to take an active part in the Central African crisis before the intervention of France (Berman, 2008: 22).

3. Political instability and nation building in the Central African Republic

It is not enough to claim that the RCA is late. We still have to try to answer the following question: why this delay? It is in this perspective that we approach this chapter of our study by trying to identify, to highlight the impact of political instability on the CAR. Political independence was also the first victory won by Africans over the imperialist powers. Another fight promises to be tight. It is no longer a question of fighting against a foreign occupation or

against a common oppressor. It's about fighting an internal virus that keeps growing: the virus of division. After the struggle for decolonization, our leaders must now lead the fight of national construction for the building of a united and prosperous nation. But if we consider the political instability that reigns in French-speaking black Africa, then we understand the difficulty there is in building viable nations in this part of the continent (Tamekamta, 2013:9).

3.1. The trampling of the work of national construction

After its independence, the CAR at the time of national construction (Decoudras, 1995: 10). But before any analysis, it is necessary to say what national construction is. It can be defined from three components:

- The use of a strong and personalized power allowing national unity around a man.
- The installation of a single party to overcome centrifugal forces;
- The administration which is incumbent on the management of the country (Decoudras, 1995: 12).

Given the artificial nature of our states, there are many divisive factors that could hinder the harmonious development of nation building. The first concern of any government is to try to build a nation by bringing together seemingly irreconcilable elements. It is therefore difficult to see how an unstable political regime, engraved with turmoil of all kinds, can easily carry out this work of national construction (Kalck, 1992: 26). This is therefore one of the impacts of these phenomena on the Central African Republic.

The work of national construction is thus hampered by the instability of political regimes. She is stalling and one wonders if the leaders have kept their promise.

Indeed, a foreign turnaround begins to be felt after its independence. The Central African leaders who, in announcing their political program, placed particular emphasis on national construction, magically turned away from this task. Their fundamental concern, their permanent concern becomes the consolidation of their position and the strengthening of their authority. The work of national construction was thus sacrificed on the altar of the satisfaction of personal needs. Once a shaken political regime crumbled, the new rulers in power strove to put in place a security apparatus that had nothing to do with nation building. We were then witnessing the setting up of a whole complex network of internal and external intelligence, which, far from constructing, engages in a systematic settling of accounts, all seasoned by sensational declarations. Haunted by the frequency of overthrows of governments, the Central African leaders who thus had to bring down the regimes around them abandoned this work of national construction to ensure first that they did not risk losing power to the profit from another group. This relegation of national construction to the background plunges the country into stagnant misery (Duhem, 2013: 5)

Moreover, the reaction of this army did not bode well for the building of a united and prosperous nation. When she was not collaborating with the regimes in place, instead of putting herself outside of all political activity, she intervened in the government and took power: the reasons she put forward seemed at first very reassuring for the people who still retained the hope of seeing his condition improve. When we observe the behavior of the Central African army during the first decade of independence and try to seriously reconsider these words of President Sékou Touré, we are surprised by the gap that existed between intentions and reality. It is therefore clear that an army was at the service of national construction. If it was she who occupied herself with politics, she turned away, so to speak, from the tasks which fell to her. The work of national construction feels a serious blow which gradually trims the wings of national integration. Moreover, national integration was not left out. In CAR, national construction could not be conceived without the integration of all social strata. However, in this region of Africa, national integration was often incomplete. Whatever the nature of the regime encountered in the CAR, national integration was ensured by the army and the single political party (Decoudras, 1995: 20).

The army, which should therefore be the center in which the mixing of populations must take place, misses out on its role as a driving force for national integration. It was to her that the task of confronting the scourge of tribal divisions and promoting discipline duty and civic-mindedness and national consciousness should fall in part. But his maneuvers became rather political. It was much more concerned with the destabilization of regimes, military intervention, the implementation of political plots and assassinations and the struggle to retain power. This state of affairs could only contribute to accumulating a whole series of factors that hampered the work of national construction, thus rendering national integration incomplete in the CAR. One of the impacts of this instability of the political regimes of this region of the globe was manifested by the reversal of the army and the leaders, which led to the trampling of the work of national construction. The army was not, in the CAR, the only appropriate instrument of national integration. On the other hand, there was the party which, better than any social organization, was responsible for educating the masses, for indoctrinating them to make them convinced militants.

In the CAR, therefore, whatever the nature of the regime, the single party was the ideal instrument for promoting national integration. It is, as is commonly said, the crucible where all the living forces of the nation were mobilized. The single party was therefore the expression of the nation. That is why all the social organizations have been incorporated into it. It therefore became the only weapon that could fight against separatism and underdevelopment. But this single political party itself faced many difficulties (Duhem, 2013: 5).

In a country plagued by political instability, the first thing, the first decision taken by the new strongmen of the system was to dissolve the single party. At that moment, one may well wonder what became of the work of national construction (Kalck, 1992: 40). After this abolition of the party, had anyone ever thought of another instrument to ensure its succession? We could therefore see how much this phenomenon of political instability had an impact in the CAR. The people were therefore left to themselves, any gathering of more than four people became suspicious and soldiers were sent to try to disperse the men. Political life was thus brought to a halt. The people fell asleep in apathy as they began to understand that they are kept out of the activities that decide their fate. This is one of the reasons why, in the CAR, the people should not be counted on to defend the fall of a regime, regardless of the degree of popularity of its leader (Tamekamta, 2013:5).

3.2. From threatened national unity to the worsening of tribal affinities

As we have just seen, political parties, instead of being instruments of national integration, appeared rather as forces of oppression. This leads to hypocrisy of the mass which, law of waging an open war against the party, pretends to be integrated into it, while seeking other channels of transmission through which it could easily find the solutions to its problems. The party, casually, began to deteriorate from below. Within the party, small groups formed and soon became parties within a party. The height of these events was the tribal character of these groups that were formed. The dissensions continued and there was thus a serious threat hanging over the unity of the whole country. The tribal affinities that we thought had completely vanished reappeared within the single party. Each group thus formed suspects the other of wanting to confiscate power. Everyone was therefore on the alert and this was a situation that did not bode well for national unity. Thus, the instability of political regimes had an impact on the social and political organizations of the States in question and jeopardized the national unity of the country. Instead of arriving at a national conscience, at a national solidarity, one ended up rather with a feeling of mistrust which hovered over all the members of the party. This is why people took refuge most often in ethnic groups and always resorted to the old, tried and tested tribal solidarity. The tribal community represented total security for the African from French-speaking black Africa (Tamekamta, 2013:5).

In addition to this intensification of tribal affinities which were born within the instrument of national integration, we discovered a series of maneuvers which were not on the

side of an ethnic group, but rather on the side of an individual. , of a figure that was emerging within the party that we were lining up. This situation gave rise to struggles for influence, opposition between individuals with a view to seizing power. Each major figure now relied on his own political clientele to establish his authority and dreamed of a possible change in the situation that propelled him to power. These struggles for influence sometimes went so far as to provoke serious internal divisions which jeopardized the national unity of the country in question. We were thus heading towards a risk of balkanization (Mbog, 2013: 10).

The political instability of the regimes in the Central African Republic created a climate of division where ethnic particularities and national dissensions arrived. The constant change of governments, the succession of plots, far from leading to the establishment of a solid centrifugal force, rather leads to an explosion. The different groups that made up the country tended to identify with their tribe of origin and the state represented for them nothing more than a vague and abstract notion instituted by the head of state with the complicity of Westerners. to perpetrate the enslavement of the rural masses. The individual, instead of presenting himself as a member of the state, as a citizen, of a nation, presented himself rather as a member of a determined ethnic group. Even the poorest members of the rulers' tribe considered themselves privileged and, despite their social position, held no hope of eventual political ascent. They almost always identified with the ruling elite and claimed to hold power. When the fall of the regime then occurred, we saw the other ethnic groups warmly welcoming the new strong men and presenting them as saviors while the group of the overthrown regime installed an atmosphere of mourning (Mbog, 2013: 10).

We then heard in the streets expressions like these “the masters had become the slaves”. The new leader in place, instead of thinking of building the nation which had long suffered from this ethnic divide, sought rather to take his revenge and to satisfy his revenge. If he did not entirely decimate the elite of the rival tributes, he hindered their rise either by snatching positions of responsibility from them, or by blocking all the channels that could allow them a social ascent. There was therefore, so to speak, a climate of eternal opposition between the tribes vying for power and doing everything possible to ensure that they took over the reins of the State or at least ensured control of political decisions. . Such events were a danger for the national unity of the country which risked fading. This national unity, very precarious at the start, fell into disrepair over the years (Tamekamta, 2013:7).

The CAR therefore risked balkanization during the first decade of its independence. This succession of changes that occurred was not likely to strengthen the feeling of belonging to the same nation, but unfortunately contributed to pushing Africans to confine themselves to the small groupings that had preceded the colonial period. This behavior of the masses should not be seen as an attitude hostile to the work of national construction. The Central African was not rebellious to the formation of a nation. It is rather the failure of the institutions put in place and very often subject to change, the inadequacy of national integration, the excessive importance given to political affairs, thus relegating social organizations and the work of supervising the mass in the background, which constituted serious threats to the national unity of a country.

All the social organizations that existed well before independence had been dissolved or incorporated into the single party to allow better national integration. This is a good initiative, but which had really not been put into practice. Because when the villager found himself in town, and he did not meet the warm welcome to which he was accustomed in his countryside, he automatically had recourse to the people of his tribe who could well provide him with the support he needed. Moreover, the difficulties faced by this man who came from the countryside to integrate into the community forced him to turn to the members of his tribe. While there was a party that was to promote this integration into the new social environment, we observed people falling prey to serious problems of the same order. This is the reason why the hinterland environment tended to recover in the cities. People tended, in large cities, to group together according to tribes or according to ethnicity. They were true that this

phenomenon was not unique to the CAR and that it was found in other African countries as well. But the real problem was that in the CAR, we had a state that had not yet managed to establish itself as a strong nation. Such experiences, when they were coupled with a proliferation of tontines and tribal associations, even clans, and when to all this was added the threat of a perpetual change of regime, there was reason to be afraid. For the national unity of the country which could easily sink into balkanization (Duhem, 2013: 5).

We therefore see how great the impact of the instability of political regimes was in the Central African Republic. It was necessary to feel in the trampling of the work of national construction clipping the wings of national integration and constituted a serious threat to national unity because of the intensification of tribal affinities and the risk of balkanization. But the impact of this phenomenon was not limited only to nation building. It embraced a wider and vital domain for modern societies. This was the area of development.

3.3. Political instability and development

After independence, two main poles of attraction were the target of the CAR: national construction and development. As far as this notion of development is concerned, it is quite obvious that it encompasses a complexity of economic, social, cultural and psychological phenomena that we cannot address here exhaustively, for lack of very precise scientific data. This is a notion on which many specialists in development economics cannot agree. At the risk of embarking on the dangerous path of controlling development, it would be prudent to limit oneself to a definition from which it is possible to analyze the impact of political instability on development in the CAR (Duhem, 2013: 5).

To ensure the realization of a plan, it was therefore absolutely necessary to let time take its course. But the face of instability offered to the CAR suggested that the development plans were never followed from start to finish because they intervened, in most of the time. The instability of the political regimes was therefore a serious handicap to the implementation of the plans in the CAR. What becomes of economic development when planning is so often shaken by political crises?

Each new team that comes to power must rethink the economic data and present its development policy, which is not always in the same direction as that of the predecessors. This leads to the failure of the predictions. The country remained steeped in underdevelopment. We arrive here at an idea that did not fit with Western conceptions. Political instability was not a consequence of underdevelopment. Just because Africa was underdeveloped did not mean there was political instability. It was true that the state of underdevelopment of a country could cause a dependence which sometimes placed it in a situation of political instability. But political instability cannot be explained by underdevelopment. Rather the opposite is possible. It is political instability that accentuates underdevelopment. The more a country grew into an unstable regime, the more its economy collapsed and the more it sank into a state of underdevelopment. It was therefore not underdevelopment that was the cause of political instability in the CAR. It is rather the political instability of these countries perpetuated its state of underdevelopment. It was therefore one of the causes of the presence of underdevelopment in the CAR. Underdevelopment was thus an effect of the impact of political instability on the nation. (Tamekamta, 2013:7).

Planning is not the only component of development which is thus severely shaken by the political instability of the regimes in place. The same is true for aid and economic relations with the outside world. Tax is an important source of income here but is not enough to finance the plan. As for the creation of money, it is a procedure relatively little used in Africa: it assumes that the government is entirely in control of the issue; however, very often, this is organized on an international basis, through monetary cooperation agreements. The loan which very often is of external origin.

To succeed in financing its plan, the government resorted either to borrowing or to aid, which were operations conditioned by external relations. Aid from a developed country to a

French-speaking black African country largely depended on the relations that exist between the two countries. The CAR, in order to develop, needed to intensify its relations with the outside world in order to receive from it significant and long-term aid. But how could she obtain long-term help when governments were very often subject to change? Which Western country accepted, for example, to make loans to African States extending over a period of more than five years without having first ensured the stability of these States? This is one of the effects of political instability on the CAR. The CAR thus watched helplessly as its development plans stagnated, for lack of foreign aid for its financing, national resources having proved insufficient. The CAR, during the first decade of independence, was thus in a very boring situation for the governments. The wariness of Western states to grant increased aid to the CAR therefore stemmed from the political instability that reigned there (Mbog, 2013: 10). They were therefore condemned to see their development plans collapse before they even had time to enter their operational phase.

It should be noted that the instability of a regime could tip the country in question from one block to another. This change of course was a serious blow to the development of the nation. To get an idea of this phenomenon, one only had to consult the table which shows that three countries share more than half of the total aid. These are Ivory Coast, Senegal and Cameroon. When we push the analysis further, we realize that these three countries are States that benefited and enjoyed undeniable political stability. This finding clearly showed that a possible change in aid would lead to economic stagnation and, by extension, the failure of development forecasts because this aid was not mathematically distributed equally among the countries that had it need. To avoid these failures of the plans due to the reluctance of foreign investors and the refusal of the aid necessary for their financing, the CAR governments had endeavored to stimulate foreign investments by the process of investment codes. But before any analysis, it is necessary to say what an investment code really is (Tamekamta, 2013:12).

Despite the attractive conditions presented by these investment codes for the foreign investor, the latter still shows distrust of countries with very unstable political regimes. As we have seen, the investment codes provided for arrangements that sometimes extended over a period of 10 to 20 years. However, for these investments to subsequently prove beneficial for both the foreign company and the host country, the political regime in place had to enjoy undeniable stability. We therefore feel, through these investment codes, the impact of the instability of political regimes on the CAR.

We are therefore in the presence of a young State which is looking for itself, in the long and bitter struggle it is waging against underdevelopment. But this phenomenon of instability, which grew more and more during the first decade of independence, constituted a real handicap to the development of the CAR. This is a country that could not get by on its own. He needed aid, loans and above all to maintain economic relations with the outside world, especially with the developed powers. But unfortunately, this help was not free, the loan even less so. All that remained was economic relations with the outside world, characterized in particular by exchanges, which were really vital for the states of French-speaking black African (Tamekamta, 2013:14).

3.4. The perpetual change an infernal circle

After their accession to independence, the CAR had obtained its autonomy (Tamekamta, 2013:9). Being unable to think of a new system of administration that would fit in with local realities, he found himself suddenly confronted with a thorny system: the gradual reform of the administration. Let us not forget that the few European executives who occupied almost all the positions of responsibility had been placed in their position by the former metropolis. It was now necessary to ensure the necessary succession. The brutal change of certain regimes in the CAR during the first decade of independence distorts the Africanization of executives. Either the new leaders who take power carry out a rapid evacuation of the former settlers and put in their place nationals with no experience of administrative affairs, or else it

is the administration which, with each coup de force, with each overthrow of regimes, metamorphoses, no longer obeying, so to speak, the gradual reform of the administration which was supposed to be done in successive stages taking into account sectors not yet mastered by nationals. It is therefore not surprising that in the CAR, people complain about the administrative heaviness which very often leads to inexplicable delays in the processing of certain files. We are entitled to wonder if this is not one of the causes of a hasty reform of the administration which had been put in place by the former colonial powers. My administrative machine is comparable to a society. Her life has its ups and downs. After a crisis which therefore shakes this machine, it is advisable to let a transition period pass to allow it to catch its breath. Such a procedure does not exist in CAR. The brutality with which regimes follow one another in the CAR therefore has serious consequences for the administration. This leads to a blockage of the administration, to a stagnation that compromises the development of the country. This is one of the aspects of the impact of the instability of political regimes in the CAR (Tamekamta, 2013:22).

The crisis affecting the Central African Republic is the most serious that the country has known since independence. Not only is it the final act of a progressive disintegration of the state, but it calls into question the Central African social fabric by reviving the question of autochthony and by designating the Muslim as the harmful foreigner. In March 2013, in the absence of French military intervention and decisive African military mobilization, the Seleka rebels appropriated the CAR, inventing a traitorous power in the process. The complexity of the current situation, having reduced the effectiveness of FOMAC, Resolution 2127 of the UN Security Council remains an opportunity that France and the African institutions (ECCAS and AU) had seized to restore the humanities in RCA. In this context, the transitional authorities and their international partners are promoting rapid elections and classic DDR as a way out of the crisis to the detriment of the long-term response required by a country in pieces. In doing so, they take the risk of making the Central African Republic a territory in a situation of chronic instability where the border between peace and war will be blurred for a long time.

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